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AN ACTIVE  DEBATE  iS now under way in the United States,  Europe, and 
Japan about the scope for expansionary  macroeconomic  policies  in the 
near term.  Although  unemployment  is  at postwar  historical  highs  in 
Europe and the United  States and inflation has receded  rapidly in the 
major economies  of the  Organization for Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development,  there is remarkable reticence in advocating expansionary 
policies  among the  governments  of  OECD  countries.  One  school  of 
thought holds that much of the unemployment  problem in Europe, and 
to a lesser extent in the United States and Japan, results from real wages 
at inappropriate levels  and thus the problem cannot be ameliorated by 
adjusting demand-management policies.  The West German Minister of 
Economics  strongly enunciated this view. ' 
Nevertheless, our  economies are still carrying  the burden  of an excessive 
real  wage level from  the seventies. A considerable  part  of current  unem- 
ployment  is due to the fact that labour  has now become too expensive. 
. . . However, correcting  false distribution  relations  needs time. A start 
has been made  in most of the major  industrial  countries.  The course  must 
be held over the medium  term if a growth  process which does not bring 
with  it a danger  of inflation  is to be set in motion  and sustained. 
Because this view has gained widespread currency, and because  I took 
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this position  under  different  circumstances  in my 1979  BPEA paper,  it is 
opportune  to reexamine  the arguments  in light  of recent  circumstances  .2 
The  real  wage  issue seems to invite  extreme  positions.  In some models 
real  wages are of no significance  for macroeconomic  outcomes, while in 
others they are of decisive importance. Not  surprisingly,  a middle 
position appears to be firmly supported  by the data. High real wage 
levels are  an important,  though  by no means  exclusive, factor  explaining 
the high  levels of unemployment  in OECD  countries  during  much  of the 
past  decade. Real  wages do not explain  the sharp  jump  in unemployment 
since 1980 in most countries; that jump is clearly tied to monetary 
contraction  rather  than  to supply  factors. Real wages do, however, help 
explain  the secular  rise  in  unemployment  since 1973.  Furthermore,  while 
high real wages complicate demand-management  policies, they do not 
preclude  them. Recall that Keynes saw demand  expansion  as a solution 
to high  real  wages; in some circumstances  high  demand  can allow  prices 
to rise relative  to rigid  nominal  wages. 
One of the themes of my 1979  BPEA article was the difference in 
structure  between U.S. and  European  wage-price  behavior.  That  differ- 
ence continues  to pervade  almost  every equation  described  in  this  paper. 
Thus for the United States an index of the cyclically corrected labor 
share-termed  a real wage gap-is  not a good indicator  of aggregate 
supply conditions, but it is a useful measure in Europe and Japan. 
Outside  the United States, tight labor markets  often lead to significant 
increases in real wages. It is partly  the expectation  that real wages will 
increase that forestalls  a demand  expansion  in those countries,  particu- 
larly  Germany. 
This discussion of the current  real  wage problem  is divided  into three 
parts. The first section provides  a summary  of wage and  profit  develop- 
ments in recent years, with a focus on the post-1979 period, and 
constructs  a simple  wage-gap  variable.  The second section  confirms  that 
the wage-gap  variable  is a useful measure  of aggregate  supply  conditions 
2. Jeffrey  D. Sachs, "Wages,  Profits  and  Macroeconomic  Adjustment:  A Comparative 
Study," BPEA, 2:1979, pp. 269-319. Michael  Bruno  and I discuss the wage issue in a 
macroeconomic  context  in several  papers,  including  "Supply  versus  Demand  Approaches 
to the Problem  of Stagflation,"  in Herbert  Giersch, ed., Macroeconomic  Policies for 
Growth and Stability: A European Perspective  (Kiel: Institut fir  Weltwirtschaft,  1981), 
pp. 15-60; and Sachs and Bruno, "Input  Price Shocks and the Slowdown  in Economic 
Growth: The Case of U.K.  Manufacturing," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 49 (5), no. 
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outside the United States. The wage gap helps to explain three central 
macroeconomic  developments:  the  time  path  of unemployment  in  OECD 
countries, the shifts in the Phillips  curve in several countries since the 
early 1970s,  and  the decline  in profitability  in the same period.  The third 
section takes up the most delicate issue: the implications  of high real- 
wage levels for demand  management,  both at the current  time and  more 
generally. The last section addresses policy choices in the near term. 
Some technical  problems  related  to the wage-gap  measure  are  discussed 
in an appendix. 
Recent Wage Developments  in the Major OECD Economies 
Since 1979,  high-unemployment,  low-productivity  growth,  and  dete- 
rioration  of the terms  of trade  in the OECD  countries  have substantially 
depressed real  wage growth  in most of these economies. Table 1 shows 
the growth  rates  of real  hourly  compensation  in manufacturing  (with  the 
consumer price index as the price deflator)  for six of the seven large 
OECD  economies from 1960  to 1982.  Data limitations  for Italy  preclude 
its treatment  here. In all these economies except the United Kingdom 
real  hourly  compensation  has slowed sharply  since 1979,  on the order  of 
2.5 percentage points a year. Compensation  includes social security 
contributions  and  provides  a comprehensive  measure  of labor  costs but 
does not represent  take-home  pay. Real  take-home  pay per  hour  worked 
has decelerated  even more dramatically  in recent years. In the United 
Kingdom  the breakdown  of incomes policies under  the Labour  govern- 
ment after 1978  and new government  wage concessions during  1979-80 
kept  growth  of real  wages high  during  1979-81. 
It continues to appear  that only extreme  duress in the labor  markets 
can  bring  about  real  wage  deceleration  in the European  economies. After 
the first oil shock in 1973,  real wage increases hardly  slowed in Europe 
until  after 1975  and  then did so only in an environment  of extremely  high 
unemployment.  After  1980,  economic  weakness  again  led  to a substantial 
deceleration  of real  wages. 
Despite the poor growth in real wages in recent years, profitability 
has not improved  in the major  economies. In the United Kingdom,  the 
United States, France, and Germany the share of labor income in 
manufacturing  value added,  SL, was higher  in 1981  than 1978,  and  this is 258  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 1. Annual Percentage  Changes in Real Hourly Compensation 
for Manufacturing,  Selected Periods, 1960-82a 
Percent  per year 
Country  1960-73  1973-79  1979-81  1980  1981  1982b 
Canada  2.8  2.5  -0.6  -1.0  -1.1  0.8 
France  5.3  4.3  1.8  2.8  0.8  3.0 
Germany  6.4  5.3  2.2  2.9  1.5  -0.3 
Japan  8.2  2.3  0.5  -  1.5  2.5  2.1 
United Kingdom  3.7  3.7  3.8  4.9  2.7  2.4 
United States  1.8  0.9  -0.9  -1.6  -0.1  0.2 
Sources:  Compensation  is from U.S.  Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Office of Productivity and 
Technology,  "Underlying  Data for  Indexes  of  Output per Hour,  Hourly Compensation,  and Unit  Labor Costs  in 
Manufacturing, Eleven  Countries,  1950-81"  (BLS,  1982); the consumer  price index is from International Monetary 
Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  various issues;  and earnings for  1982 are from Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development,  Main Economic  Indicators,  various issues. 
a.  Real hourly compensation  is defined as nominal hourly compensation  deflated by the consumer  price index. 
b.  Hourly earnings instead of compensation.  The  1982 data are preliminary. 
also true after adjusting  SL for cyclical productivity  shifts to produce  a 
"full-employment"  labor  share,  SAL. (The  method  of  adjustment  is 
described  below.) Both SL and  SfL  are shown in table 2. The table shows 
that, in the four countries  with 1981  data, the levels of SL and  SfL  are far 
above their 1969  levels. 
These shifts in labor's share are closely mirrored  by changes in the 
pretax  rate  of return  to capital  in the manufacturing  sector. In  the United 
States the profit  rate in manufacturing  fell from 17.5 percent in 1978  to 
12.4  percent in 1981,  according  to OECD  definition.3  In Germany  there 
was a decline  from 14.6  in 1978  to 13.0  in 1980;  and  in  the United  Kingdom 
from  7.8 percent  in 1978  to 4.1 percent  in 1981.  (Recent  data  are not yet 
available for the other OECD economies.) As discussed in my 1979 
BPEA  paper,  the 1978  levels were already  quite  depressed. 
The SfL  measure is calculated by adjusting  actual SL for cyclical 
movements  in  productivity.  This  SL  can  be written  as (W/Pv)(V/L),  where 
W, V, and L are hourly compensation, value-added  output, and total 
man-hours,  respectively; and Pv is the value-added  deflator.  The vari- 
ables represent the manufacturing  sector only, for lack of data from 
other sectors. The SfL  measure is constructed by replacing (VIL)  by 
(VIL)f,  where the latter  is average  labor  productivity  when labor  is fully 
employed. 
3. The pretax profit  rate is the gross operating  surplus  (profit  plus adjustment  for 
capital  consumption  plus income of self-employed  persons)  divided  by the replacement 
cost of the gross capital  stock. Jeffrey D.  Sachs  259 
Table 2.  Share of Labor in Manufacturing  Value Added, Selected Years, 1969-81a 
Percent 
Actual share  Normalized  share 
Country  1969  1973  1978  1981  1969  1973  1978  1981 
Canada  68.5  65.8  67.1  n.a.  68.1  65.8  67.1  n.a. 
France  42.0  44.8  45.6  47.4  42.6  44.8  45.6  45.8 
Germany  52.3  58.8  59.5  63.3  54.2  58.8  59.7  61.3 
Japan  40.3  44.5  50.2  n.a.  41.0  44.5  49.4  n.a. 
United Kingdom  70.0  71.4  74.0  82.8  70.0  71.4  72.9  83.9 
United States  69.1  71.6  71.6  75.6  69.4  71.6  72.2  75.3 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on data from Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  "Underlying  Data for Indexes  of 
Output per Hour." 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Actual  labor share is total labor cost  divided  by nominal value added in manufacturing. The normalized share 
is described  in the  text.  Value  added is  gross  product  at market prices  in manufacturing for all countries  except 
Canada and the United  Kingdom,  in which it is valued at factor cost. 
Because (V/LI)  is not observed, it must  be estimated,  and  preferably 
in a straightforward  and  theory-free  manner,  so as not to prejudge  some 
of the subsequent  analysis. For this reason, I make  the simple  assump- 
tions that (1) actual  productivity  equaled  full-employment  productivity 
in 1960, 1973, and 1979;  (2) (VIL)f  grew at a constant exponential  rate 
during the 1960-73 and 1973-79 periods; and (3) the growth rate of 
(VIL)f  during  1979-81 is a simple average  of the observed rate and the 
1973-79 rate.4  As discussed below, these calculations  may overstate 
(VIL)f  in the recent recession; if they do, the normalized  labor share 
could be larger  than  calculated.S 
4. One  must  take  some  position  on the role  of cyclical  versus  trend  factors  in the sharp 
productivity  slowdown  in France  and  Germany  after 1979.  This  is clearly  hard  to do as of 
early 1983.  Suppose  that in 1976  one tried  to forecast  the 1973-79  rate by the procedure 
described  in the text (averaging  the rates  of 1960-73  and 1973-75).  The result  would  have 
been prediction  of a post-1973  slowdown  (the 1960-73  rate  minus  the 1973-79  rate)  of 1.9 
percent  in the United  States (versus 1.7 actual);  0.3 percent  in Germany  (0.1 actual);  2.4 
percent  in the United  Kingdom  (2.7 actual);  0.7 percent  in France  (1.2 actual);  2.9 percent 
in Canada  (2.6  actual);  and  2.6 percent  in Japan  (3.2  actual).  These  estimates  are  thus  fairly 
accurate, and would have proved far superior  to a simple extension of the 1960-73 
productivity  trend  to 1974  and 1975. 
5. One  of the points  made  below  is that  in the high-unemployment  period  of the 1970s, 
declining manufacturing  employment  involved the shutdown  of least-efficient,  labor- 
intensive  firms.  Thus,  fairly  systematically  across  countries,  sustained  rises in unemploy- 
ment  actually  raised  measured  productivity  relative  to trend,  as low-efficiency  firms  were 
eliminated  from  the data.  Since 1979  unemployment  in Europe  was well above 1973  levels, 
the observed  productivity  level in 1979  may  be biased  upward  relative  to (V/L)f.  This  effect 
appears  strongest  in Germany  and  France,  and  weakest  in Japan,  where  lifetime  employ- 
ment  policies  in manufacturing  preclude  large-scale,  rapid  closing  of inefficient  plants. 260  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 3.  Shifts in Normalized  Labor Share of Manufacturing  Value Added, 
Selected  Periods, 1973-81a 
Percentage  points 
Total 
Period and  average 
country  riseb  SL(W  -  PC)  SL(PC -  PV)  -SL(V  -  ef 
1973-78 
France  0.1  2.1  0.4  -2.3 
Germany  0.2  3.4  -0.1  - 3.1 
United Kingdom  0.3  2.5  -0.8  -  1.3 
United States  0.1  1.1  0.2  -  1.1 
1978-81 
France  0.0  1.0  0.8  -1.8 
Germany  0.5  1.8  1.3  -2.5 
United Kingdom  3.7  3.4  2.2  -1.8 
United States  1.0  -0.9  3.1  -1.1 
Source:  Same as table 2. The method of calculation  is shown  in text equation  1. 
a.  Canada and Japan are omitted because  comparable data are not available. 
b.  Components  may not add to total because  equation  I is an approximation. As described  in the text,  labor share 
is indicated by SL and full employment,  by f  The rates of change are denoted  as follows:  real manufacturing GNP, 
v; man-hours, e; consumer  prices, PC;  manufacturing deflator, p,;  and hourly compensation,  w. 
It is useful to ask why SfL  is higher  in 1981  than  in 1978,  given the low 
real wage growth  during  1978-81. By the definition  of labor share, one 
can write  the percentage  change  in  SfL  as equal  to real  wage  growth  minus 
trend  productivity  growth,  minus  the change  in consumer  prices  relative 
to manufacturing  value-added  prices. In countries in which real wage 
growth  has slowed, it has been more  than  matched  by a combination  of 
productivity  slowdown  and shifts in the terms  of trade  against  manufac- 
turing-that is, shifts in PC  relative  to Pv. Formally,  one can write 
(1)  ASfL  =  SL(W  -  PC) +  SL(PC  -  PV) -  SL(V  -  01, 
where A signifies annual changes in level and lowercase variables  in- 
dicate annual rates of change of their uppercase counterparts.  The 
SL(PC  -  Pv)  term  captures  changes  from  several  sources:  supply  shocks, 
in which input  prices change  in real  terms;  changes  in indirect  tax rates; 
changes  in  exchange  rates,  which  vary  prices  of nontraded  goods  relative 
to manufacturing  tradables;  and demand shifts away from or toward 
manufacturing. 
Table 3, which provides an accounting  of ASfL  for 1973-78  and 1978- Jeffrey D.  Sachs  261 
Table 4.  The Wage Gap in Manufacturing,  Selected Periods and Years, 1960-82a 
Percent 
Country  1960-64  1965-69  1973  1978  1981  1982 
Canada  -0.6  0.0  -1.4  0.6  n.a.  n.a. 
France  -0.2  0.0  -0.3  1.5  1.9  4.4 
Germany  - 2.2  0.0  8.0  9.4  12.2  8.9 
Japan  0.2  0.0  9.8  20.3  n.a.  n.a. 
United  Kingdom  -2.8  0.0  3.1  5.3  19.3  19.0 
United  States  1.8  0.0  3.1  3.9  8.1  9.0 
Source:  Same as table 2. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  The wage gap,  Wg, is defined as logSf(t)  -  log SL (%965-69)  = log [(WIPv)I(VIL)f -  log [(WIPv)I(VIL)f]196569, 
wheref  is full employment and the variables are the same as those  whose  rates of change are shown in table 3, note 
b. See text and the appendix for a more complete  description. 
81, is based on equation 1. The striking  fact about the table is the 
important  role played by Pc  -  Pv in the manufacturing  profit  squeeze 
since 1978,  a much  larger  role than  was seen during  1973-78.  Part  of this 
shift reflects the second oil shock. The especially large values in the 
United States and the United Kingdom  reflect  the added  effects of the 
sharp  appreciation  of exchange rates, which have narrowed  margins  in 
tradable  goods. In the United Kingdom there was also an important 
increase  in indirect  taxes. To these factors  one may add  another:  a more 
general shift in demand away from manufacturing  to other domestic 
sectors, which makes the profit squeeze in manufacturing  a sectoral 
rather  than  economy-wide  phenomenon.  Because of data  limitations  on 
wages and productivity  in other sectors, I have not examined  this last 
factor closely. Finally, table 3 shows that a slowdown in productivity 
growth after 1978, reflected in falling absolute values of -  SL(V -  EY, 
also plays a significant  role in accounting  for ASfL. 
Table  4 presents  estimates  of a concept I call the wage-gap.  I assume 
that the normalized  labor share was at an appropriate  level for full 
employment  during  1965-69  and  define  the wage gap, Wg,  in any year as 
the departure  of the normalized  share  from that level, measured  by log 
SfL(t) -  log SfL(1965-69).  The wage gap in several countries is shown in 
table  4 for various  years;  it is positive in all OECD  countries  in the table 
in recent  years, indicating  that  the normalized  labor  share  of value added 
in manufacturing  has risen since 1965-69. 
The Wg  measure  is related  to labor  demand.  Under  three  conditions- 
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firms  are  not  demand  constrained;  and  if  they  remain  along  the  production 
frontier-profit-maximizing  labor  demand,  LD, can be given as6 
(2)  log (LDILf) =  -  [1/(1 -  ox)]Wg, 
that  is, the percentage  deviation  of labor  demand  from  full employment 
is a linear  function  of the constructed  wage gap. Actual  labor  demand  is 
not given by equation  2 because the three conditions do not generally 
obtain. Nonetheless, Wg  is a good predictor  of labor demand  in most 
OECD  economies,  as shown  below. Note also  that  desired  output  supply, 
Vs, relative  to potential  output  supply, Vf can be written  as 
(3)  log (Vs/Vf) =  -  [(x/(1 -  (x)]  Wg. 
Again,  there is no presumption  that Vs  closely tracks  actual  output, V. 
The precise measures shown for Wg  in table 4 are subject  to several 
possible biases. Some of the major  measurement  problems  are taken  up 
in  the appendix.  But Wg  does contain  important  information  as discussed 
in the following. 
The Wage Gap as an Indicator of Aggregate Supply 
The wage-gap  concept can be  judged  by its usefulness  for  determining 
aggregate supply conditions, and on this basis even the very simple 
measure  estimated  here does well. Three  examples  are analyzed. First, 
Wg  can track the pattern  of unemployment  in most OECD economies, 
particularly  if additional  demand-side  variables  are  also utilized.  Second, 
this variable  can help to explain shifts in the Phillips  curve in several 
economies. The idea  here  is that  price  changes  are  a function  of aggregate 
demand, VD,  relative to aggregate  supply, Vs; a rise in Wg  reduces Vs 
and makes inflation  intensify for a given level of aggregate  demand. 
Third, Wg  helps to explain the decline in profitability  in most of these 
economies even when cyclical variables are also added to the profit 
equations. 
6.  Up to a constant, the wage gap is defined  as log [(WIP,)I(VIL)f],  or log(WIPv)  - 
log(VIL)f.  Assuming  aVIaL  =  WIPv,  we see that WIPv  is proportional  to VIL.  Thus, up 
to a constant, Wg  =  log(V/L) -  log(VIL)f,  which upon substitution  of the production 
technology  yields  equation  2. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  263 
In all these applications,  Wg  is less powerful  in the United States than 
in the other OECD economies, suggesting  both that U.S. fluctuations 
have been largely demand-driven,  and that U.S.  supply conditions 
cannot be measured  well by observed ratios of wages to productivity. 
But  the  results  also point  out the  danger  of generalizing  U. S. econometric 
results.  The widely recognized  cyclical independence  of real  wages and 
unemployment  in the United States simply does not hold as a general 
proposition  for other  economies. 
Table  5 presents  regressions  for the six OECD  countries. In the first 
regression  unemployment  is regressed on its own lagged value, a time 
trend  for productivity  growth,  a trend  shift  after 1974,  and  the logarithm 
of the lagged  product  wage: 
(4)  Ut =  a0 +  aO  IUt  +  a2time +  a3t197581 +  a4 log (W/PV)t-  I 
In  the second  regression  the last two variables  are  replaced  by the lagged 
wage gap: 
(5)  Ut =  to +  alUt-I  +  a2time +  t3Wgt-l. 
The results show a strong  positive relation  between the real wage, or 
wage gap, and unemployment  in four of the six OECD economies; the 
relation  is weak and statistically  insignificant  in France  and the United 
States. The unemployment rate for Japan is a notoriously sluggish 
indication  of cyclical conditions.  It is used here  and  in subsequent  tables 
to include Japan in the analysis on a consistent basis with the other 
countries  studied.  According  to the point  estimates,  each increase  of 1.0 
percentage  point in the product  wage relative  to trend  raises the unem- 
ployment  rate in the long run by 0.5 percentage  point in Canada,  0.04 
point  in France,  0.4 point  in Germany,  0.04 point  in  Japan,  and 1.1  points 
in the United  Kingdom.  There  are several  reasons, however, not to take 
such  point  estimates  too seriously,  the main  one being  that  the equations 
do not truly identify an aggregate  labor-demand  schedule, as shown 
below. 
The results for estimates of equations  4 and 5 are a bit surprising  in 
light of a long history of papers in which the real wage is shown to be 
acyclical or even procyclical. Keynes wrote in the General Theory that 
a real wage squeeze was necessary to explain the supply response of 264  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 5.  Regressions  of Aggregate Unemployment  on the Wage Gap, 196141a 
Independent  variable 
Lagged  Log of  Summary 
unem-  Log of  lagged  statistic 
ploy-  lagged  Lagged  real 
ment  Time  Trend  product  wage  money  -  Durbin- 
Country  rate  trend  shift  wage  gap  balanceb  R2  H 
Canadac  0.63  -0.80  0.59  18.05  ...  ...  0.78  2.55 
(3.55)  (-1.97)  (1.81)  (2.09) 
0.63  0.07  ...  ...  15.72  ...  0.85  0.45 
(5.46)  (2.82)  (2.23) 
0.52  0.13  ...  ...  19.59  -  1.09  0.84  1.34 
(3.05)  (1.93)  (2.39)  (-0.94) 
France  0.56  -0.03  0.24  1.92  ...  ...  0.98  0.19 
(2.88)  (-0.19)  (2.50)  (0.69) 
0.92  0.06  ...  ...  4.45  ...  0.97  -0.38 
(8.24)  (2.05)  (1.51) 
0.42  0.30  ...  ...  8.07  -4.31  0.98  n.a. 
(1.87)  (3.01)  (2.70)  (-2.49) 
Germany  0.51  -1.03  0.11  18.24  ...  ..  .  0.89  0.54 
(3.11)  (-2.88)  (0.95)  (3.16) 
0.55  -0.04  ...  ...  18.37  ...  0.90  0.17 
(4.44)  (-0.92)  (3.53) 
0.41  0.41  ...  ...  17.57  -9.46  0.95  -0.53 
(4.10)  (3.36)  (4.55)  (-3.86) 
Japan  0.19  -0.36  0.14  3.50  ...  ...  0.93  -1.05 
(1.45)  (-3.98)  (3.86)  (4.23) 
0.35  -0.01  ...  ...  3.36  ...  0.94  -  1.30 
(2.72)  (-1.03)  (3.99) 
0.20  0.02  ...  ...  3.34  -0.31  0.94  -  1.17 
(1.31)  (0.9%)  (4.11)  (-1.55) 
United  0.82  -0.95  0.68  20.05  ...  ...  0.92  n.a. 
Kingdom  (2.40)  (-2.81)  (4.09)  (3.08) 
1.13  -0.15  ...  ...  23.61  ...  0.91  1.57 
(5.48)  (-2.01)  (4.20) 
0.85  -0.01  ...  ..  .  14.66  -9.32  0.94  2.82 
(4.33)  (-0.17)  (2.58)  (-2.84) 
United States  0.68  -0.68  0.18  22.10  ...  ...  0.55  1.28 
(3.68)  (-1.41)  (0.99)  (1.51) 
0.62  0.04  ...  ...  10.67  ...  0.54  1.93 
(3.43)  (1.04)  (1.07) 
0.32  0.38  ...  ...  -15.28  -  11.17  0.54  1.31 
(1.50)  (2.41)  (-  1.03)  (-2.20) 
Sources:  Author's  estimates  of text equations  4, 5, and  6. Data  are  from  sources  cited  in table 1, with  the exception 
of the unemployment  rate and the money stock, which are from OECD, Main Economic  Indicators,  and IMF, 
International  Financial  Statistics,  respectively. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the aggregate  unemployment  rate. The product  wage and the wage gap refer  to the 
manufacturing  sector. All lags are one-period  lags. The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b. MI is used for all countries  except the United  States, where  M2 is used. 
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firms  to a demand  contraction;  but Dunlop  and Tarshis  challenged  him 
in the late 1930s on this point using U.S. data.7  And they have been 
supported  by subsequent  studies. Recent work by Geary and Kennan 
purports  to show that real wages and employment  are independent  in 
other countries also, in contradiction  to the findings  here, but several 
technical aspects of that work are troubling  and cast doubt on their 
conclusions.  Grubb,  Layard,  and  Symons  have  recently  reached  conclu- 
sions in unpublished  work similar  to those of table  5.8 
There are two ways to reconcile the conclusions of this paper with 
the established  literature.  First, the United States is simply different, 
and  the literature  has mainly  dealt  with the United States. I show below 
that real wages in the Great Depression moved countercyclically in 
Europe  and procyclically in the United States, so that the differences 
appear  to be long-standing.  Second, even in Europe it is doubtful  that 
real  wages move countercyclically  in all business cycles and likely that 
the supply  shocks of the 1970s  have strengthened  the links between Wg 
and U in recent years. Malinvaud  convincingly argued in 1977 that 
different  cycles may have different  characteristics  in this regard;  the 
1970s  happened  to be a period of adverse supply shocks that pushed 
firms  onto their  labor-demand  schedules.9 
7. These classic articles are John T. Dunlop, "The Movement  of Real and Money 
Wages," Economic  Journal, vol. 48 (September  1938),  pp. 413-34; and Lorie Tarshis, 
"Changes  in Real and Money Wages," Economic  Journal, vol. 49 (March 1939),  pp. 
150-54. 
8. Patrick  T. Geary  and John Kennan, "The Employment-Real  Wage  Relationship: 
An International  Study," Journal  of Political Economy,  vol. 90 (August  1982),  pp. 854- 
71; and D. Grubb,  R. Layard, and J. Symons, "Wages, Unemployment  and Incomes 
Policy," unpublished  manuscript,  London  School of Economics, 1982. 
The most important  problem  with the Geary-Kennan  analysis is that the wage is 
measured  relative  to the wholesale  price  index  (WPI),  rather  than  to P,. This  procedure  is 
treacherous  in a period  of supply  shocks, which raise WPI  relative  to Pv. It appears  that 
the real  wage  has  decreased  when  measured  as WIWPI,  when  in  fact it has  increased  when 
measured  as WlPv.  Grubb,  Layard,  and  Symons  show  that  when  employment  is regressed 
on WIWPI  in  an  equation  that  also includes  a real  price  of intermediate  inputs  (which  Geary 
and  Kennan  exclude),  the expected negative  relation  between  the real  wage and  employ- 
ment  is found.  The  regressions  of table  5 show  directly  that  when WlPv  rather  than  WIWPI 
is the  explanatory  variable,  the negative  wage-employment  link  is established.  Also, Geary 
and  Kennan  fail  to allow  for the productivity  slowdown  after 1973. 
9.  Edmond Malinvaud, Theory of Unemployment Reconsidered  (John Wiley,  1977). 266  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
DEMAND  AND  SUPPLY 
Even if the wage  gap  rises with  higher  unemployment,  one cannot  say 
whether  demand  or supply factors are behind the rise. Since 1979,  for 
example,  demand  (monetary)  contraction  has strengthened  the dollar  in 
the United  States  and  raised  both Wg  and  unemployment.  Supply  factors 
in Europe  and  Japan  were probably  responsible  for the sharp  rise in Wg 
throughout  the early and mid-1970s.  Thus the statement  that wages are 
too high does not imply  that supply  rather  than  demand  factors explain 
the increased unemployment, only that real wages must grow more 
slowly than  trend  productivity  to restore  full employment. 
With  cyclical disequilibrium,  demand  factors  can  raise  unemployment 
directly  without  raising  Wg.  This has been the case since 1979,  with the 
strong  monetary  contractions  in the major  OECD  economies. It is worth 
stressing  just how contractionary  monetary  policies have been in recent 
years. Real money balances grew at 6.1 percent a year in Germany 
during  1975-78, then declined at 3.3 percent a year during  1978-81. In 
the United States they grew 0.7 percent annually  during 1975-78 and 
declined  4.8 percent a year during  1978-81. In the United Kingdom  the 
growth  rates  for  the two periods  were  2.5 and -4.0  percent,  respectively. 
The evidence that the recent rise in unemployment  is not induced  by 
wage gaps is shown in the display below, which presents actual and 
forecast unemployment  rates in 1982  based on the estimates of table 5. 
The first  three columns of this display  use the basic wage-gap  equation 
5. In Germany  and the United States these equations  fail to account  for 
the latest rise in unemployment;  in the United Kingdom  the equation 
actually overpredicts  the rise in unemployment,  given the jump in Wg 
from 3.0 percent in 1978  to 19.1 percent  in 1981.  Data are not available 
to project  the 1982  unemployment  rate for Canada  and Japan.  The last 
two columns of the display show forecasts from equations that add 
lagged  real money balances, (MIPC)t_  l, as a demand  variable.  The new 
regression equation isjO 
10. The money  variable  is MI for all countries  except the United  States,  for which  M2 
proved  far  more  satisfactory.  Because  of problems  of data  availability,  the money  variable 
is an end-of-year  measure,  rather  than an annual  average, while the deflator,  PC, is an 
annual average. Wherever  possible, I have verified that this timing inconsistency is 
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(6)  Ut =  (x  +  axlUt_i  +  a2time  +  a3W,g_1 +  a4log(MIPA),-1 
In table 5 both Wg I and  (M/PC)t_ I are significant  explanatory  variables 
in Europe and the demand  variable  is significant  in the United States 
also. Furthermore,  predictions of 1982 unemployment  are markedly 
better: 
1982 unemployment rates 
Equation without  Equation with 
MIPc  MIPc 
Actual  Forecast  Error  Forecast  Error 
France  8.0  8.2  0.2  7.9  -0.1 
Germany  6.1  4.5  -1.6  6.2  0.1 
United Kingdom  12.7  14.3  1.6  13.0  0.3 
United States  9.5  8.0  -1.5  9.0  -0.5 
It seems, therefore,  that  contractionary  monetary  policies  can  operate 
on unemployment  independently  of their  effects on Wg.  In Germany  and 
the United States at least, these independent  effects are necessary to 
explain the sharp  recent increases in unemployment.  If one turns this 
proposition  around,  it can be concluded that a reduction  in unemploy- 
ment  may  be possible  with  a demand  expansion,  even  without  a reduction 
in Wg,  though a large wage gap may limit how far demand  can reduce 
unemployment.  Obviously  a demand  expansion  may reduce Wg  also. 
The  simple  disequilibrium  models  are  very  clear  on this  point.  Suppose 
VD  = VD(MIPc)  and Vs =  Vs(WlPv).  With M, W,  PCS and Pv fixed, these 
models determine output as V =  min (VD, Vs). A demand expansion  is 
powerful  in raising  output  as long as V c  Vs (which is probably  true in 
Germany  and the United States in 1982),  but cannot  raise output  above 
Vs. Without  doing formal  testing, I would suggest that this view is too 
restrictive,  and that the specification  of equation  6 is probably  correct: 
the effects of higher  MIPc on V, and  hence on U, are  largely  independent 
of whether  VD S  Vs. 
The 1970-73  period illustrates  this proposition.  During  this time Wg 
rose sharply while unemployment  remained low.  A  strong demand 
expansion, reflected  in rising real money balances, overcame the con- 
tractionary  effects of the profit  squeeze so that Vs  fell but actual  output 
remained  high.  Profits  declined  despite  high  output.  In effect, firms  were 
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illustrate these trends, which prevailed throughout  Europe. In 1973 
Germany  halted  the rapid  money growth;  the following  year the unem- 
ployment rate doubled, and it virtually doubled again in 1975.  11 Thus for 
Germany, 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Wage gap (percent)  -0.2  1.9  2.9  5.3  8.0 
MIPc  (percentage  deviation  from 
trend)  0.8  1.0  3.2  6.2  -3.5 
Unemployment  rate (percent)  0.9  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.3 
Profitability  (ratio)  0.22  0.21  0.18  0.16  0.16 
DEMAND,  SUPPLY,  AND  INFLATION 
Even if monetary  expansion  is effective when Wg  is high, it may have 
unfortunate  inflationary  consequences because excess demand, VD - 
Vs, can be high even if VD  itself is relatively  low-that  is, if high Wg  has 
reduced Vs. Thus Wg  as a determinant  of Vs has a role in the Phillips 
curve. The instability  of the Phillips  curve in recent years is notorious, 
and there is a widespread  perception  that the "inflation  threshold," or 
NAIRU, level of unemployment  has risen in the 1970s.  Part  of this shift 
can be understood  as a consequence of the wage-induced  shift in Vs. 
I begin with a standard  Phillips curve and add Wg  as an explana- 
tory variable.  Current  inflation  is explained  by distributed  lags of infla- 
tion, LpC, (0.5pc,_, + 0.3pC,_2  + 0.2pc  t3);  import  price changes, LPM, 
(0.5PM, +  O.5PM, I); unemployment,  LU,  (O.5U, +  O.5U,t1); and the 
wage gap, LWg, (O.5Wg  + O.5W,g  1): 
(7)  PC =  a0 +  OILPc  +  Oa2LPM  +  a3LU  +  U4LW. 
The results, shown in table 6, generally support  the theory. In every 
country a rise in Wg  shifts the Phillips curve upward, so that current 
inflation is raised at each level of apparent slack, as measured by 
unemployment. The shift is particularly  significant  in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The point estimates suggest 
that the inflationary  consequences of a 1.0 percentage  point rise in Wg 
11. Unemployment  in 1974  was 2.6 percent  and  in 1975,  4.7 percent. 
The MIPC  measure  for Germany  is calculated  by regressing  the logarithm  of MIPC  on 
time for 1960-68 and then taking  deviations of actual values from this time trend for 
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Table 6.  Phillips Curve Equations  for Consumer  Prices, 1963-81a 
Independent  variable 
Lagged  Lagged 
rate of  rate of 
change  change  Lagged  Summary  statistic 
in con-  in  unemploy- 
sumer  import  ment  Lagged  _  Durbin- 
Country  prices  prices  rate  wage gap  R2  Watson 
Canada  0.39  0.38  -0.39  18.21  0.83  1.14 
(1.45)  (3.06)  (-0.91)  (0.58) 
France  -0.05  0.26  1.20  14.88  0.90  1.56 
(-0.23)  (5.80)  (3.30)  (0.93) 
Germany  -0.17  0.06  -1.54  63.58  0.88  2.16 
(-0.93)  (1.76)  (-7.35)  (6.88) 
Japan  0.07  0.15  -  13.51  50.05  0.58  2.07 
(0.25)  (2.65)  (-  2.10)  (1.73) 
United Kingdom  0.43  0.15  -2.01  95.89  0.88  2.31 
(2.27)  (1.71)  (-2.54)  (3.95) 
United  States  0.85  0.17  -1.21  36.25  0.90  1.34 
(5.48)  (5.00)  (-3.68)  (2.88) 
Sources:  Author's  estimates  of text equation  7, with  data  from  sources  cited in table  5. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the current  rate  of change  in the consumer  price  index. See text for an explanation 
of the  lags.  The  unit-value  index  for  imports  is used  to calculate  changes  in import  prices.  The  numbers  in parentheses 
are t-statistics. 
are equivalent to a fall in unemployment  of 0.5 percentage point in 
Canada, 0.4 point in Germany, 0.04 point in Japan, 0.5 point in the 
United Kingdom, and 0.3 point in the United States. These estimates 
are  close to the long-run  effects on unemployment  of higher  Wg  discussed 
above. 
The inclusion of Wg  in the Phillips curve equation reduces the im- 
portance of lagged inflation  in the equations  for Germany  and Japan. 
Compare  the coefficient  on lagged  Pc in equations  with and without Wg 
(t-statistics  in parentheses): 
With  Wg  Without  Wg 
Germany  - 0.17  (- 0.93)  0.51  (1.72) 
Japan  0.07  (0.25)  0.31  (1.25) 
There is no evidence of inertial inflation  in these countries once the 
Phillips  curve more adequately  measures  aggregate  supply. In general 
what appears as  inflation inertia may in fact reflect the persistent 
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One further demonstration  of the importance  of Wg  for aggregate 
supply  relies on the well-known  factor-price  frontier.  12 Returning  to the 
Cobb-Douglas  production function,  V  =  (eXtL)aK(l  -  ,  I define profit- 
ability as Tr  =  [V -  (W/Pv)L]/K, and full-employment  efficiency  labor 
as Lf =  ex'Lf. Then it is straightforward  to show that when  L = LD (see 
equation  2 above), or equivalently,  when a  VIaL  =  WIPV,  13 
(8)  log Tr  =  -  [ot/(1 -  ot)]  Wg -  at  log [K/Lf] +  constant. 
Thus the (log) rate of return  to capital  is a linear,  decreasing  function  of 
Wg  and (log) capital  intensity, (K/LI).  Because L does not always equal 
LD if firms  are demand-constrained,  actual  profitability  may differ  from 
equation  8. 
In the regressions in table 7, I confirm  that Wg  has a strong role in 
explaining  profits, after allowing for a time trend (to capture secular 
changes in the K/Lf variable) and for the direct cyclical effects of 
unemployment  on Tr.  The estimated  equation  is 
(9)  log Trt  =  (x0  +  OtIWg  +  at2time  +  (X3Ut. 
Note that the estimates of otl  are negative and always very significant, 
again  with the exception of the United States. For the other countries, 
profitability  can be improved  directly  by a reduction  in U or by a fall in 
Wg.  Each 1.0 percentage  point reduction  in Wg  is associated with a rise 
in the profit  rate of 0.4 percentage  point in Canada,  0.3 point in France, 
0.2 point in Germany, 0.7 point in Japan, and 0.2 point, both in the 
United Kingdom  and in the United States. A fall in the British  wage gap 
to zero from the 1981  level would raise the rate of return  from  approxi- 
mately  4.1 to 8.5 percent.  Note also that  there  is an exogenous  downward 
trend in the rate of return  in Canada,  Germany,  the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, presumably reflecting the trend increase in 
K/Lf. 
12. Michael Bruno was among the first to note the importance  of the factor-price 
frontier  for the supply developments  in the 1970s  in "Raw Materials,  Profits,  and the 
Productivity  Slowdown," Working  Paper  660 (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
1981).  See also Bruno  and Sachs, "Input  Price Shocks and the Slowdown  in Economic 
Growth." 
13. When  aVIaL  = WlPv,  one may  write  wr  as [V -  (dVIdL)L]IK.  By Euler's  equation, 
V = (dVIaL)L  + (dVldK)K,  so Tr also equals  (dV/dK).  It is then  straightforward  to calculate 
dV/dK,  dV/dL,  (VIL)f,  and Wg  = log [(WIPv)I(VIL)f].  Combining  the resulting  expressions 
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Table 7.  Rate of Return on Manufacturing  Capital, Selected Periods, 1960-81' 
Independent  variable 
Unem-  Summary  statistic 
Wage  ployment  Time  Durbin- 
Country  and period  gap  rate  trend  R2  Watson 
Canada  (1960-79)  - 3.2  0.00  -0.011  0.50  1.07 
(-4.89)  (0.00)  (-4.65) 
France  (1967-79)  -2.18  -0.24  0.06  0.82  2.30 
(-3.02)  (-4.88)  (3.36) 
Germany  (1960-80)  -1.78  0.00  -0.014  0.91  1.39 
(-3.01)  (0.00)  (-  2.55) 
Japan  (1965-80)  -3.51  -0.30  -0.037  0.96  1.81 
(-6.02)  (-3.51)  (-3.69) 
United Kingdom  (1960-81)  - 3.79  -0.01  -0.009  0.95  1.32 
(-6.70)  (-0.72)  (-  1.61) 
United States (1960-81)  -1.34  -0.06  -0.013  0.66  0.79 
(-1.16)  (-2.70)  (-2.57) 
Sources:  Author's  estimates  of text equation  9 based  on data  from  sources  cited in table  5. The profitability  data 
are  from  the national  income  account  statistics  of the OECD. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the log ratio  of gross operating  surplus  (profits  plus  capital-consumption  adjustment 
plus  income  of self-employed  persons)  to replacement  cost of total capital  stock. The numbers  in parentheses  are t- 
statistics. 
Implications  of the Real Wage  Gap for Demand  Management 
It is often incorrectly argued that "classical"  unemployment due to a 
wage gap cannot be treated by Keynesian  policies.  But the real wage 
argument  does  not,  in  itself,  provide  a  case  against  expansionary 
macroeconomic  policies.  As I noted at some length in my  1979 BPEA 
paper, demand expansion  may be very  helpful in fostering  recovery, 
particularly if the demand policies  themselves  help to reduce the wage 
gap. Whether they do depends on how wages,  prices, and productivity 
respond to the demand stimulus. 
The Great Depression provides a vivid illustration of that proposition. 
An observer  of the early  years  of the depression  could  have  made a 
"profit squeeze"  analysis of the sort made in the first half of this paper. 
Sheila  Bonnell  makes  this  point  in  a fascinating  recent  note  in  the 
Economic Record, from which I adapt some data in tables 8 and 9. 
In 1934 the first half of this paper might have been written like this: 
The major economies  of the world have been subjected to a profit squeeze  of 
remarkable  proportions  during  1929-33.  In  all  major  economies,  the  high 
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Table 8.  Wages and Productivity  during the Great Depression, 
Selected  Periods, 1928-37 
Percent 
Product  wage growth  Productivity  growth 
Country  1928-32  1932-37  1928-32  1932-37 
Germany  7.7  -4.9  -2.2  3.6 
Sweden  1.9  0.4  -0.5  4.8 
United Kingdom  2.8  -1.2  -0.8  1.5 
United States  -2.5  4.4  -4.9  3.9 
Source:  Adapted  from  Sheila  Bonnell,  "Real  Wages  and  Employment  in the  Great  Depression,"  Economic  Record, 
vol. 57 (September  1981),  pp. 277-81. 
and  others have not yet fully accounted  for the slowdown,  it appears  that some 
of the loss is irretrievable  even if a recovery gets under way. Despite the 
slowdown, real wage growth has remained  strong  in European  economies. In 
Germany  product  wages, WIP%,  grew  at 7.7 percent  a year  in the past  four  years, 
even though  productivity  levels have  been  falling  sharply!  In  the  United  Kingdom 
and Sweden real wage resistance has kept wage growth  positive despite high 
unemployment.  Only  in the United  States  have  workers  accepted  negative  wage 
growth  in line with  productivity  developments,  though  even the productivity  fall 
there  has been too steep to keep profit  shares  constant. 
The result of all of this is a remarkable  profit  squeeze that has sent labor's 
share  from  an index of 100  during  1925-29,  to 1932  values of 138.0  in Germany, 
109.0  in Sweden, 115.9  in the United Kingdom,  and 111.1  in the United States. 
Firms  adjusted  to this sharp  rise in real  labor  costs by moving  up their  schedule 
of demand  for labor,  with the result  that  unemployment  exceeded 20 percent  in 
Germany,  Sweden, and the United States, and over 15 percent in the United 
Kingdom. 
Thus it seems clear that recovery will only come when profit  margins  have 
been restored,  which means that growth  of real wages will have to be severely 
constrained  in Europe  for the next several  years. 
Robert J. Gordon, who might have been the discussant of this work, 
would have asked, for instance, for underlying trend productivity growth 
calculations for 1928-32 rather than the actual rates shown in the table. 
He  might also  have  noted  that the  profit-squeeze  hypothesis,  while 
interesting,  simply  does  not fit the data, pointing out that the United 
Kingdom,  with a larger increase  in the share of labor during 1928-32, 
had a lower  unemployment  rate than the United  States  and Sweden. 
Finally, James Tobin might have observed  that none of this precludes 
faster money growth as a solution to the crisis. 
The three main points of the hypothetical discussion-excess  product Jeffrey D.  Sachs  273 
Table 9.  Labor Share and Unemployment  Rate during the Great Depression, 
Selected Years, 1928-37 
Unemployment  rate 
Labor share (index)  (percent) 
Country  1928  1932  1937  1928  1932  1937 
Germany  92.6  138.0  90.0  9.3a  30.1  4.6 
Sweden  99.0  109.0  87.5  10.2a  23.4  10.9 
United Kingdom  100.4  115.9  101.2  7.5  15.6  7.8 
United States  101.0  111.1  114.0  4.4  23.6  14.3 
Source: Same  as table  8. 
a. Data  for 1929. 
wage growth, the difference  of cyclical and trend  productivity,  and the 
usefulness  of expansionary  policy-are  all  correct  in the context of 1934. 
Germany,  Sweden, and  the United  Kingdom  achieved  a strong  recovery 
by 1937,  in each case led by reflationary  policies. In Germany  it was the 
combination  of heavy rearmament  and capital  controls under  the Nazi 
regime  that restored  demand.  In the United Kingdom  the 1931  devalua- 
tion was decisive in breaking  the fall in prices, and eventually  restoring 
demand  and  profits.  In Sweden  a combination  of expansionary  domestic 
policies and rising  exports to Germany  was responsible  for the demand- 
led recovery. In all these cases, given rigidities  in nominal  wages, the 
demand expansions reduced real wage growth and at the same time 
allowed a cyclical boost to productivity.  The profit  share in each case 
returned  to the 1928  level, and with it, the unemployment  rate. In the 
United States neither  the profit  share nor unemployment  was restored 
to levels that  existed before the depression  until  World  War  II. 
The difference  between the 1930s  and 1980s  in the task  facing  demand 
management  lies neither  in the necessity of restoring  profit  margins  nor 
in the need for moderation  of real wages. The difference lies in the 
capacity of demand policies to bring  about the needed rise in profits, 
particularly  in ways that  are compatible  with  inflation  targets.  There  are 
three points here that form the basis for the remaining  discussion on 
implications  of the real wage gap. 
First,  part  of the mechanism  of demand  policy is to engineer  real  wage 
moderation  through  higher  inflation.  While  this  was feasible  in the 1930s, 
and  perhaps  is still  today  in the United  States, it provides  a dubious  basis 
for policy in most European  OECD economies. Demand  management 
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understanding  with  the  major  wage  negotiators  that  real  wage  moderation 
is required. 
Second, in the 1930s  there were tremendous  productivity  dividends 
to be reaped  from an expansion. The case for such large dividends is 
more  dubious  today. 
Third,  the "room for maneuver"  for policymakers  is still somewhat 
limited.  In the beginning  of the depression, prices had declined signifi- 
cantly,  so that  inflationary  policies were  not  only  palatable,  but  desirable. 
In the United Kingdom  there was little discussion about a 10 percent 
rise in the consumer  price  index during  1933-37  in view of the 15  percent 
fall in the previous five years. When  the same policies start  from  a high 
level of inflation,  they can be far  less attractive. 
Despite these caveats, the data do suggest the possibility  of a nonin- 
flationary,  demand-led  recovery in Europe, if real wage growth  can be 
sustained  at current  low levels through  a period  of demand  expansion. 
This argument  is presented  below. 
To judge the possible effectiveness of demand policies, one must 
place the wage gap in an overall macroeconomic  framework.  As a first 
step I focus on the interactions  among  wages, prices, and productivity 
to examine how a demand  expansion would affect Wg.  I then examine 
the room  for maneuver  with the assumption  of an unchanged  wage gap. 
WAGE  AND  PRICE  DETERMINATION 
Econometric studies by a number of authors, including those by 
Gordon,  by Branson  and  Rotemberg,  and  by me in my 1979  BPEA  paper, 
indicate that nominal wage growth in Europe is so closely linked to 
consumer  price developments  that  a demand  expansion  is likely to raise 
Wg  rather  than  reduce it as in the 1930s.  14 The contrary  seems to be true 
in  the United  States, and  perhaps  also in Canada.  Before  turning  to some 
econometric  evidence on this point, I present  stylized versions of wage- 
price  equations  for  the United States  and  the major  European  economies 
("Europe"  in this discussion). 
14. See William  H. Branson  and  Julio  J. Rotemberg,  "International  Adjustment  with 
Wage  Rigidity,"  European  Economic  Review, vol. 13  (May 1980),  pp. 309-32;  Robert  J. 
Gordon,  "Why U.S. Wage  and Employment  Behaviour  Differs  from  That  in Britain  and 
Japan,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 92 (March  1982),  pp. 13-44; and  Sachs, "Wages,  Profits 
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In the United States nominal wage growth is well described as a 
function  of unemployment  and a distributed  lag of changes  in consumer 
prices. In Europe the link between changes in wages and consumer 
prices is virtually  instantaneous.  Thus  for the United States, 
(lOa)  w -  oto  -  a1U  + at2PC  + (1  -  ?t2)PC,-  ?t2  <  1, 
and  for Europe, 
(lOb)  w =  ao  -a1U  + Pc. 
Value-added  prices  are  well represented  in  the United  States  as an  almost 
instantaneous  markup  over normal  unit-labor  costs. The markup  may 
vary  positively  with  the cycle. 15  Value-added  prices  in Europe,  however, 
do not respond  rapidly  to, nor on a one-for-one  basis with, changes in 
unit-labor  costs.  It appears that prices respond strongly to excess 
demand, VD/Vs,  therefore falling with high unemployment  and rising 
with high wage gaps-that  is, low Vs. The linkage  between wage costs 
and  prices is present, via wage effects on Vs, but in an attenuated  form 
and with a greater  lag than in the United States. Illustrative  equations 
for the United States are16 
(lla)  Pv=  w -  (vf -  (I) -  OW(-  U,  -  ), 
and  for Europe, 
(llb)  Pv =  P  -  J2U  +  P3Wg. 
In both economies the gap  betweenpc andpv is explained  by changes 
in nonwage  costs such as those that arise from changes in the terms of 
trade  and  indirect  taxes. For instance, 
(12)  Pc = Pv -  yo(tot), 
where (tot)  signifies the percentage change in terms of  trade. An 
improvement  in the terms of trade (tot  >  0) reduces consumer prices 
relative  to value-added  prices. 
15. See Robert  J. Gordon, "The Impact  of Aggregate  Demand  on Prices," BPEA, 
3:1975,  pp. 613-62. 
16. The markup  equation  for the United States is typically stated in level form, as 
Pv = m(U)W/(V/L)f,  where m(U) is the variable  markup  and WI(VIL)f  is unit-labor  cost. 
Equation 1  la is for rate of change,  so price inflation is a function of w -  (vf -  ef) and the 
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The annual  change  in the wage gap, A  Wg  (or W9,  -  W9,_  l), is equal to 
(w -  Pv)  -  (vf -  Vf). Given the differences in timing in the United States 
and Europe, demand  expansion  (a fall in U), deterioration  of the terms 
of  trade, and a  slowdown in  trend productivity (a  reduction in 
vf -  EJ), should  have very different  effects on Wg  in the two economies. 
In the model under  consideration,  the United States would be charac- 
terized  by 
(13a)  A  Wg =  0(U -  Ut- 0, 
and  Europe  by 
(13b)  /Wg  =  a0 -  a1U -  'yO(tot) -  (vf  -  ef). 
The real  wage evolution  for the United States is 
(14a)  w  -  Pc  =  (vf  -  (I)  +  0(U -  Ut_1)  +  -yo(tot), 
and  for Europe  is 
(14b)  w -  Pc  =  oto - as  U. 
Thus in an economy with wages lagging  prices, as in the United States, 
a demand expansion reduces the wage gap; productivity  shocks and 
shocks to the terms of trade  affect the real wage directly  and do not get 
built into the wage gap. In economies with wages leading  prices, as in 
Europe, a demand expansion (or, more precisely, a low level of U) 
increases the wage gap; productivity  shocks and shocks to the terms  of 
trade  directly  affect Wg  but do not affect w -  Pc for a given level of U. 
Wage  and  price  equations  are  presented  in tables 10  and 11  for the six 
economies to confirm  the differences  in behavior  just discussed. Table 
10 shows estimates of a wage equation  like 10a. The effect of inflation 
on wages in the United States and Canada  is partially  lagged (with (X2 
significantly  below  1.0), while in the other economies the effect is 
instantaneous  (with  (2  near or above 1.0). The estimates are similar  to 
the results  presented  in my 1979  BPEA paper. 
Table 11 illustrates  the differences in price behavior among the six 
countries. The first row for each economy, showing the estimated 
equation,  is the simple  fixed markup  relation, 
(lIc)  PV=  to +  aI(w  -  vf+  E). 
As expected, otl is estimated as close to 1.0 in the United States and 
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Table 10. Nominal Wage Equations for Manufacturing,  1960-81a 
Independent  variable 
Current  Summary  statistic 
Unemploy-  change in 
ment  consumer  _  Durbin- 
Country  rate  pricesb  R2  Watson 
Canada  - 0.76  0.37  0.81  0.91 
(-3.04)  (1.48) 
France  -0.47  0.89  0.66  2.39 
(-1.75)  (3.41) 
Germany  -0.62  1.53  0.41  1.33 
(-1.76)  (3.05) 
Japan  -9.04  0.88  0.79  1.26 
(-5.46)  (6.60) 
United Kingdom  0.04  1.22  0.83  2.37 
(0.13)  (7.37) 
United States  -0.45  0.52  0.82  1.01 
(-2.14)  (3.56) 
Source:  Author's  estimates  of text equation  lOa, based on data from sources  cited in table 5. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is  the rate of change  in nominal  wages  in the  manufacturing sector.  The  numbers in 
parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  Current and one-period lagged values  were fit with the sum of the coefficients  constrained  to equal  1.0. 
significantly  different  from 1.0 in the United States, Canada,  and the 
United Kingdom, and are significantly  different from 1.0 in France, 
Germany, and Japan. In the second row for each economy lagged 
unemployment  and  the  wage  gap  are  added  to the  equation  as explanatory 
variables, 
(lId)  Pv,  =  Oto  +  Otl(w -  vf  +  ff),  +  a2Wg,-1 +  a3U,1. 
According to theory,  X2 should be positive and (3  negative,  since higher 
Wg  raises excess demand  and  higher  U lowers it. Once again,  the direct 
effects of unit-labor  costs on prices (measured  by otl)  are highest  in the 
United States and Canada  and are significantly  less than 1.0 in all the 
other  countries.  It is probably  true  that  equations  1  la and 1  lb caricature 
the differences  between the United  States  and  Europe,  because  changes 
in unit-labor  costs are a determinant  of price changes in both areas. 
However, the estimates support  the hypothesis  that  wages feed rapidly 
into prices in the United States, and  more slowly (via Wg)  in Europe. 
PRODUCTIVITY  AND  EXPANSION 
The data  for the 1930s  in tables 8 and  9 show that  recovery in Europe 
brought  with it not only deceleration  of real  wages but also a significant 278  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 11. Price Equations  for Manufacturing, 1961-81a 
Independent  variable 
Rate of 
change 
in nor-  Lagged  Summary  statistic 
malized  Lagged  unem- 
unit-labor  wage  ployment  D  Durbin- 
Country  cost  gap  rate  K  Watson 
Canadab  0.89  ...  ...  0.81  1.24 
(8.84) 
0.86  24.40  0.49  0.85  1.47 
(9.05)  (0.96)  (1.26) 
France  0.65  ...  ...  0.51  2.16 
(4.63) 
0.40  59.05  0.69  0.77  1.70 
(3.46)  (3.40)  (1.94) 
Germany  0.50  ,  .  ...  0.61  1.51 
(5.70) 
0.46  18.77  -0.40  0.71  1.68 
(5.69)  (2.73)  (-1.57) 
Japanb  0.66  ...  ...  0.71  2.67 
(6.82) 
0.61  3.93  -2.18  0.68  2.76 
(5.23)  (0.33)  (-0.68) 
United  Kingdom  0.85  ...  0.77  2.30 
(8.31) 
0.64  67.84  -  1.41  0.83  1.83 
(4.83)  (2.77)  (-2.09) 
United  States  0.92  ...  ...  0.81  1.76 
(9.17) 
0.93  17.68  -0.51  0.82  1.65 
(8.04)  (1.04)  (-  1.78) 
Source: Author's  estimates  of text equations  I  Ic and ld.  Data  are from  sources  cited in table  5. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the rate  of change  in the price  deflator  for manufacturing.  Lags are  one-period  lags. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b. Data  on Canada  are for 1961-79;  data  on Japan,  1961-80. 
increase  in productivity  growth  that  helped  restore  profitability.  Should 
one now expect that an expansion would also yield a productivity 
dividend, perhaps  one large enough to overcome a rise in w -  pc? To 
some extent a dividend  to the productivity  level is allowed for because 
the wage gap is  calculated for a cyclically adjusted value of  VIL. 
According  to the procedures  used for calculating  (VIL)f  above, actual 
productivity  in 1981  is judged to be 0.3 percent below potential  in the 
United States; 3.2 percent below in France; 3.0 percent below in 
Germany;  and-2.2  percent below in Japan.  In the United Kingdom  VIL 
is judged to be more  than  (VIL)f,  for reasons  described  below. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  279 
Have the productivity gains that might follow a fall in  U  been 
underestimated?  There are two questions here. First, have we under- 
estimated (VIL)f  for 1982, and thus overstated the current  wage gap? 
And second, are there reasons to believe that, whatever the level of 
(VIL)f, future trend productivity growth, vf -  Uf,  would be higher in a 
high  employment  economy? Broadly  speaking,  the evidence suggests a 
negative  answer  for the first  question,  and  a positive one for the second. 
Two possible effects must  be considered  in correcting  observed  labor 
productivity  for cyclical  factors. On  the one hand,  a demand  contraction 
may lower observed productivity  relative to potential if firms carry 
extensive overhead labor in the downturn.  This is the usual effect in 
U.S. data. On the other hand, if the contraction  also involves a profit 
squeeze, so that the variable  costs of the least efficient firms are not 
covered, the downturn  may raise observed productivity. This is the 
effect  predicted  by simple  production  theory.  17 The  low-efficiency,  labor- 
intensive firms simply drop out of the data. In contrast to the United 
States, this effect is predominant  in European  countries and has been 
widely noted by several authors.  18 On these grounds  one might  expect 
reductions  in average  labor productivity  in the course of an expansion 
in Europe  as marginal  production  units are brought  back  on line. 
Productivity  developments in the United Kingdom  during 1973-82 
illustrate  both phenomena.  In the years after  the first  oil shock, substan- 
tial labor hoarding  occurred, with manufacturing  productivity  growth 
during  1973-78  rising  only 1.8 percent a year, down from 4.3 percent a 
year during  1960-73.  According  to OECD, after 1978, 
economic conditions worsened significantly  faster than in earlier  recessions. 
This  was reflected  in a marked  increase  in labour  costs in relation  to the value  of 
output....  The financial  pressure  on companies  caused them  to start  reducing 
their  workforce  before the fall in output  became apparent.  .  .  . Changing  trade 
union attitudes, given that many companies risked bankruptcy  unless labor 
17. With  a production  function  having  constant  returns  to scale, V =  V(ex'L, K) and 
V/IL  rises as KIL  rises. Thus for a given capital  stock and a given level of technology, 
reductions in L raise V/L. In the Cobb-Douglas case,  log (VIL) -  log (VIL)f =  -(1  -  o) 
log (LILf),  where  ot  is the share  of labor. 
18. For the case of small OECD economies see Niels Thygesen, Exchange Rate 
Experiences  and Policies  of Small  Countries: Some  European Examples  of the 1970s, 
Essays  in  International  Finance,  136  (Princeton  University,  International  Finance  Section, 
December  1979),  especially  pp. 8-12. Thygesen  notes on page  9: "If hourly  earnings  rise 
faster  at home  than  abroad,  production  and  employment  will be reduced  until  output  per 
manhour  has risen  to offset the increase  in wages" (emphasis  mine). .  *t  'r  -  el  'r  N  o} 
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saving economies were made, may help to explain the rapidity  with which 
workforces  were reduced  without  major  industrial  disruption.  19 
Manufacturing  productivity  growth  in the United Kingdom  rose by 
3.2 percent  a year  in 1979-81  during  the steep  downturn  in  manufacturing 
production. It is doubtful that the newly unemployed  could be reem- 
ployed without a one-shot decline in average productivity on that 
account. 
A measure  of these alternative  effects can  be gleaned  from  a regression 
of average  labor  productivity  in manufacturing  on aggregate  unemploy- 
ment: 
(15)  (V/L),  =  oto  +  CXIUt  +  Ot2Ut-1  +  3Ut-2  +  ot4time +  ct5t75 -81 
The regressions  in table 12  suggest  that  the labor-hoarding  phase occurs 
at the start of a downturn  and then is overtaken  by the labor-shedding 
phase in the second year. Note that by including  the 1975-81  time-shift 
variable,  I allow for an exogenous decline in trend  productivity  growth 
after 1974. 
In Europe but not in Japan  the overall effect of a sustained  rise in 
unemployment is  to  raise measured productivity relative to trend. 
Given the constraints  on layoffs in Japan,  the productivity  effect starts 
off strongly  negative  and  remains  negative  on balance  after  three years. 
These results suggest  that  the observed  productivity  levels in 1979  were 
probably  above potential in the European  economies because unem- 
ployment  had  been high  there  for  several  years.  These  levels are  probably 
near or below potential now, given the rapid rise in unemployment 
recently, which most likely added  redundant  overhead  labor. 
Using the estimates of table 12 to measure  (VIL)f,  one can derive a 
new set of wage gaps based on adjusting  observed productivity  each 
year to full employment levels; and these can be compared  with the 
wage gaps developed earlier  that were based on trend-line  estimates of 
full-employment  productivity.  Full  employment  is defined  as the average 
unemployment  rate  for 1965-69,  denoted Uf, and (VIL)f  is calculated  by 
replacing the actual U, in equation  15 by Uf. A wage gap, Wg*,  is again 
created as log [(WIPv)I(VIL)f],  with the normalization that Wg*  is zero 
for  1965-69.  The previous  measure,  Wg, and new  measure,  Wg*,  are 
shown in table 13  for three selected years. 
19.  OECD  Economic  Surveys:  United  Kingdom  (Paris:  OECD,  February  1983), 
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Table 13. Comparison  of Alternative Wage-Gap  Measures, 1973, 1979, and 1981 
1973  1979  1981 
Country  Wg  W9*  Wg  W9*  Wg  W9* 
Canada  -  1.4  -0.4  -1.4  1.4  n.a.  n.a. 
France  -0.3  -0.6  -0.5  3.1  1.9  4.1 
Germany  8.0  7.8  8.6  14.4  12.2  17.5 
Japan  9.8  6.6  21.1  16.2  n.a.  n.a. 
United Kingdom  3.1  4.9  12.8  17.3  19.3  25.3 
United States  3.1  5.4  6.1  6.5  8.1  8.0 
Sources:  The  Wg measure  is the same as in table 4,  note a; Wg*  is from author's calculations  as described  in the 
text. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
The new measure  confirms  a rising  wage gap in recent years in all the 
economies  for which data  are available.  This measure  shows larger  gaps 
than  previously  estimated  in Canada,  France, Germany  and the United 
Kingdom,  a smaller  gap in Japan,  and  virtually  no change  in the United 
States.  Wg*,  like Wg, can track unemployment movements  as in table 5 
(Wg*  and Wg  are of course highly correlated).  It is probably  unwise to 
choose between Wg  and Wg*  without  more  formal  econometric  estimates 
of the production  technologies  in these economies. 
The second possible effect of the cycle on productivity  is the effect of 
slack on the productivity trend itself. Several writers have recently 
contended  that slack has affected  the trend  growth  rate, not through  the 
short-run  labor-hoarding  phenomenon, but through deeper channels 
including  lower capital  accumulation,  reduced  mobility  of labor  among 
firms  and sectors, and less learning  by doing  and exploitation  of econo- 
mies of scale. Dickens makes  the interesting  point  that  the productivity 
"lost" in U.S. downturns  is not made  up during  the upturns.  The longer 
is the cyclical downturn,  according  to this analysis,  the lower  is the peak- 
to-peak rate of productivity  growth.20  Similarly,  peak-to-peak  produc- 
tivity growth  during  the Great  Depression  was generally  far below that 
of the 1920s  in European  economies. These bits of evidence suggest  that 
a return  to higher  employment  might  improve  trend  productivity  growth 
from 1983  forward.  In this case, the restoration  of higher  employment 
levels would make room for faster real wage growth  in the future, but 
would do little currently  to shift  the share  of profits  in value added. 
20. See William  T. Dickens,  "The  Productivity  Crisis:  Secular  or  Cyclical?"  Econom- 
ics Letters, vol. 9, no. 1  (1982),  pp. 37-42. Jeffrey D.  Sachs  283 
Thus, unlike in the 1930s, a demand  expansion alone is unlikely to 
reduce the wage gap quickly to zero. In Europe a demand  expansion 
would probably  raise Wg,  thereby intensifying  the cyclically adjusted 
profit  squeeze. It does not follow that an expansion  is therefore  unable 
to lower unemployment  or raise profits. Even though Wg  is high, a 
demand  expansion  can still  be fully  effective. First, if VD  < Vs,  a demand 
expansion  can  raise  output  at  least  to the level of VS.  Since  tight  monetary 
policies rather  than  a rise in Wg  seem to explain  the recent sharp  rise in 
unemployment  in Germany  and  the United  States, there  should  be scope 
for expansion in these economies. Second, the previous discussion, 
particularly  of the early 1970s, suggests that demand  policies may be 
able to raise output  even beyond Vs. Firms  may be willing, at least for 
some time, to meet demand at prices below marginal  cost (in other 
words, to produce at V >  VS)  in order to maintain  market  shares and 
customer  relations. The evidence of the early 1970s  does not seem to 
support  the strict  disequilibrium  view that V = min(VD,  Vs),  though  this 
assertion  requires  careful  econometric  scrutiny. 
Before  turning  to an assessment of near-term  policy alternatives,  it is 
worthwhile summarizing  the arguments  that have been made on this 
point: 
Real wages remain  high relative to full-employment  productivity  in 
the manufacturing  sectors  of the major  OECD  economies. The wage gap 
has actually  risen  since 1979  in France,  Germany,  the United  Kingdom, 
and  the United States. 
The large wage gaps, together with the direct effects of extremely 
tight monetary policies, account for the high OECD unemployment 
rates. These monetary  policies are also a factor in the large  wage gaps, 
at least in the United  Kingdom  and United States. 
Demand  expansion  and contraction  can affect output  independently 
of any effect on Wg.  Specifically, expansionary  demand policies can 
operate  even without  reducing  the wage gap. This is especially  true  now 
in the United States and Germany,  where the wage gap did not account 
for the sharp  rise in unemployment  after 1981. 
A large wage gap shifts the Phillips  curve upward.  A given level of 
unemployment  is more  inflationary  when Wg  is high. 
A large wage gap shifts the profit  rate downward  for each level of 
unemployment.  On the other hand,  given Wg,  a reduction  in unemploy- 284  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
ment  raises  the rate  of return.  Thus  an expansionary  policy can probably 
raise  profitability  even if it does not lower Wg. 
A demand  expansion  would probably  raise real  wage growth  outside 
the United States, and is thus unlikely to meliorate  the wage squeeze 
(except  for the arguments  made  below). 
There  is probably  no large,  one-time  productivity  dividend  waiting  to 
be recaptured  with a return  to full employment.  Because low-efficiency 
production  units have been idled in the past several years, bringing 
current  unused  capacity  back  on line could  even involve a one-time  drop 
in average productivity.  However, there is probably  scope for raising 
productivity growth over the next several years through a demand 
expansion. 
Policy Choices in the Near Term 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give detailed prospects for 
individual  economies under various demand  management  policies. In 
this concluding  section, I make three modest observations.  First, in all 
the major  OECD  economies, unemployment  is now so high  that  contin- 
ued reduction  in inflation  will probably  be achieved even without any 
reduction  in Wg.  In other words, unemployment  can be reduced now 
without  jeopardizing  recent gains in fighting  inflation,  even if the cycli- 
cally adjusted  rate  of profit  is not improved.  Second, the fall in oil prices 
in the past year, which will reduce consumer prices relative to value 
added prices, should directly raise profitability  in the manufacturing 
sectors of the major  OECD  economies,  just as higher  oil prices  squeezed 
profitability  in those sectors in 1973  and 1979.  Third,  there may now be 
a good opportunity  for devising social contracts  between governments 
and trade unions in several European economies under which faster 
demand  expansion is offered  in return  for continued  moderation  of real 
wages. 
High real wages should not now be a reason for continued  contrac- 
tionary policies,  particularly  in Germany. In all the major OECD 
economies, unemployment  at the end of 1982  was so high  that  continued 
reductions  in inflation  are likely even without any reduction  in Wg.  To 
illustrate  this proposition,  the inflation  rate  projected  from  the equations Jeffrey D.  Sachs  285 
in table 6 are shown below for some alternative  paths for 1983  import 
prices, assuming that 1983 unemployment  remains at the levels that 
prevailed  at the end of 1982  and that Wg  remains  unchanged  from 1982. 
Given the recent fall in oil prices and the likelihood  of U.S. dollar  and 
pound sterling  depreciation  in the course of 1983,  the most likely cases 
in the display are falling import  prices in Germany, stable or slightly 
rising  import  prices in the United States, and more marked  rises in the 
United Kingdom-the boldface  projections  in the display. 
Inflation rate (CPI, year to year) 
1983 forecast  of inflation rate 
5 percent  5 percent 
1982  decrease  No  change  increase 
inflation  in import  in import  in import 
rate  prices  prices  prices 
Germany  5.3  -2.2  - 2.1  -  1.9 
United States  6.2  4.3  4.8  5.2 
United Kingdom  8.6  5.2  5.6  6.0 
The assumption  here  that Wg  will remain  unchanged  in 1983  may  itself 
be too pessimistic,  in which case the inflation  projections  in each cell for 
that year are too high. The recent 15 percent fall in the dollar  price of 
petroleum  alone should  lead to a significant  reduction  in Wg  and  to a rise 
in profits.  Assuming  that the value share  of energy inputs  in total gross 
output in manufacturing  is now about 10 percent, a 15 percent real 
reduction  in energy  input  prices should  raise Pv relative  to PC by about 
1.5 percent. If WIPc is unaffected by the fall in energy prices, WIPv 
would also fall by 1.5 percent. In this case, profits  would rise approxi- 
mately  4 to 5 percent  (perhaps  one-half  to one percentage  point)  accord- 
ing to the estimates  in table  7. 
Even with  this  gain,  a substantial  profit  squeeze  will  remain  in  Europe, 
the United States, and  Japan.  The U.S. situation  is probably  most easily 
cured:  a reversal  of the dollar  appreciation  of 1980-82  will go far  toward 
reducing  Wg  because nominal  wages are unlikely  to respond  strongly  to 
such a depreciation. 
In Europe  the problem  continues  to be more  difficult,  though  several 
institutional  changes on the horizon  are promising.  After several years 
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tinued wage indexation,  there have been a number  of recent cases in 
which a compromise  on partial  indexation  was successfully reached.21 
In 1981 the European Commission adopted guidelines indicating  the 
need for reducing  indexation  in the face of external shocks or interna- 
tional  noncompetitiveness.  In 1982  in Belgium,  Denmark,  France, and 
Italy various  private  and public  actions were taken  to limit  the scope of 
indexation.  In Sweden the new socialist government  undertook  a very 
large 16  percent  devaluation  in October 1982,  with the apparent  under- 
standing  of the major  trade  union  federation  there that  wage bargainers 
would accept the resulting  reduction  in real wages. The understanding 
seems to be that a real wage reduction  is a worthwhile  price to pay for 
increased  external  demand  and employment. 
It is unfortunate,  however, that the major OECD economies have 
been unable  to engineer  similar  comprehensive  arrangements.  The  trade 
union movements in those countries reflect skepticism  that real wage 
levels are  in any way responsible  for  the continuing  high  unemployment. 
It is particularly  hard to identify excess  real wages when monetary 
contraction is clearly the major force behind recent unemployment 
increases.  Meade  and  Malinvaud  have  recently  responded  independently 
to these doubts by proposing  that adjustments  in real wages be under- 
written by "aggregate  demand  insurance," in which demand-manage- 
ment  policies  are  in  place  to prevent  real  wage  reductions  from  depressing 
output  in the short  run.22 
Although  such policies are not now on the public  agendas  in France, 
Germany,  and  the United Kingdom,  they deserve careful  consideration. 
Contractionary  policies have been shown to achieve moderation  of real 
wages, but at the costs of slower growth  and continued  high  unemploy- 
ment. Reductions in the wage gap should be easier to engineer  on the 
upswing if trade unions and macroeconomic policymakers properly 
regard  it as a target  of policy and  a matter  for negotiation, 
21. For  an excellent  recent  discussion,  see Michael  Emerson,  "The  European  Stagfla- 
tion Disease in International  Perspective  and Some Possible  Therapy,"  paper  presented 
at the Conference  of the Centre  for European  Policy  Studies  on European  Policy  Priorities 
(Brussels,  December  1982). 
22. See E. Malinvaud,  "Wages and Unemployment,"  Economic Journal, vol. 92 
(March  1982),  pp. 1-12; and James Meade, "Domestic Stabilisation  and the Balance  of 
Payments,"  Lloyds  Bank  Review, no. 143  (January  1982),  pp. 1-18. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  287 
APPENDIX 
Wage-Gap Measurement 
THE  WAGE GAP is designed to measure  the percentage  deviation of the 
actual  product  wage, W/P,, from  the wage consistent with full employ- 
ment of labor. Under the competitive assumption  that aV/dL  =  W/Pv, 
the objective is to compare W/Pv  with aV/dL  measured  at full employ- 
ment. In a detailed  calculation  of Wg  for each country,  it would  no doubt 
be best to estimate the production technologies of various sectors 
econometrically,  and to calculate aVIaL  for various possible levels of 
sectoral  employment.  The text takes a far simpler  approach  to illustrate 
the merits of a wage-gap  measure without being burdened  by several 
ancillary  problems  of econometric  estimation.  The idea is to assume a 
Cobb-Douglas  technology, for which the marginal  product of labor, 
dVIaL,  is  a fixed proportion of  the average product of labor, V/L 
(specifically,  a  VIaL  =  oV/L, where a  is the share of labor). A guess is 
then made  for (VIL)f,  which is used as an indicator  for (aVIaL)f. 
This appendix  underscores several possible problems  with the cal- 
culations in the text. These problems are the difficulty  of estimating 
(VIL)f;  the assumption  of proportionality  between V/L and aVIaL;  the 
data  limitations  in  measuring  V/L  and  W/Pv;  and  the use of manufacturing 
sector data for the overall economy. These issues are taken up in turn 
below. 
The problems  associated with estimating  (V/L)f  from observed V/L 
were  mentioned  in the text. In the first  stages  of a downturn  in a business 
cycle, typically V/L <  (VIL)f.  If L remains below Lf for an extended 
period,  however, it is likely that V/L  > (VIL)f.  In the approach  taken  in 
this paper, 1979  is taken as a year in which actual  and full-employment 
productivity  are equal. In fact, given the high unemployment  rates in 
Europe  for several years up to and including  1979, it is probably  true 
that V/L > (VIL)f,  and therefore  that the wage gap for recent years is 
underestimated. 
Under  the Cobb-Douglas  assumption,  (VIL)f  and (d  VIaL)f  grow  at the 
same  rate.  If the production  function  is not Cobb-Douglas,  however, the 288  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1983 
growth  of these two variables  may  diverge.  As an example, suppose  that 
V is CES in K and  L, with Harrod-neutral  technological  change  and the 
elasticity  of substitution,  ou,  less than 1.0: 
(16)  Vf =  [u(exfLf)-P  +  (1 -  u)K-P]-P1(1  +  p) <  1. 
Then, along a growth  path  with rising  KfIVf,  (d  VIaL)f  will increase  more 
rapidly  than  (VIL)f.  The wage-gap  measure,  which compares  W/Pv  with 
(VIL)f,  will overstate the gap between W/Pv and (dV/dL)f.  Put equiva- 
lently, the Cobb-Douglas  assumption  implies  that the normalized  labor 
share  of value added should  be constant. In fact, with or  <  1 and (KIV)f 
rising, the normalized  labor share should also rise; observed increases 
in the labor  share  would not, then, be evidence of excess wages. 
This effect does not appear  to be of overriding  significance,  for both 
empirical  and  theoretical  reasons.  Most  important,  in  the  rapid  deepening 
of capital  of the 1960s  the share of labor  rose very little, and much  less 
than the increase during 1969-82. Thus during the full-employment 
growth  of the 1960s  there is little evidence of a sharp  secular  rise in the 
share of labor. On a theoretical  level, as long as or  is fairly close to 1.0 
(say, between 0.6 and 1.0), and technological  change  is Harrod-neutral, 
the observed changes in (KIL)f  in the 1970s  would not explain most of 
the increase  in the share  of labor.  Nonetheless, capital  deepening  could 
explain some of the apparent  rise in Wg,  and further  econometric  work 
on this point is warranted. 
A third problem with Wg  lies in measurement  errors in the value- 
added  components.  In the aggregate  national  income  accounts,  the share 
of employee  compensation  in value  added  tends  to rise secularly  because 
an increasing  proportion  of the labor  force shifts from self-employed  to 
dependent  status. Employee compensation  covers dependent  employ- 
ment only. To account for this secular  trend  a correction  is often made 
for aggregate  data by imputing  some of self-employed  income to em- 
ployee compensation.  The problem  is greatly  attenuated  for the manu 
facturing  sector, in which dependent  employment  is usually  a high and 
nearly  constant  proportion  of the labor  force and small-scale  enterprise 
is often not counted in the measure of value added. Still, it would be 
useful to look more closely for this possible bias. 
The final  data  problem  involves the use of measures  for the manufac- 
turing  sector to judge the wage-gap  problem  for an overall economy. 
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for only the manufacturing  sector offers good cross-country  measures 
of hours  worked  and  hourly  compensation.  There  are reasons  to believe 
that wage gaps in other sectors would differ from those that I have 
calculated.  A change  in  exchange  rates,  for  example,  can  cause  important 
relative  price  changes  within  a country  between  tradable  and  nontradable 
goods sectors, so that the same nominal wage developments across 
sectors can yield very different  wage-gap  measures.  Also, the manufac- 
turing sectors of most of these OECD economies are more highly 
unionized than other sectors, suggesting  that nominal  wage develop- 
ments across sectors within  a country  might  be different,  and in partic- 
ular, that the wage gap in manufacturing  might  be larger  than  in the rest 
of the economy. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert J. Gordon: One of the most outstanding  puzzles in macroeco- 
nomics is the enormous  increase  in unemployment  that has taken  place 
in Europe  as compared  to the United States. In contrast  to the 1960s  and 
early 1970s, when the average unemployment  rate in major OECD 
countries (except Italy and Canada) was  at roughly half the U.S. 
rate, by  1983 the unemployment rate in many European countries 
approached  or exceeded that in the United States. In this paper  Jeffrey 
Sachs addresses a central policy question of worldwide  concern: can 
expansionary  policy be relied  upon to reduce  the unemployment  rate  in 
Europe, or does  the increase in unemployment in Europe have a 
structural  interpretation?  Those who support  the second interpretation 
would predict that expansionary  policy will be stymied by a steep or 
vertical aggregate  supply curve that translates  growth  in nominal  GNP 
directly  into higher  prices rather  than  higher  output. 
In  asking  this  question,  Sachs  extends  the  analysis  originally  suggested 
by Giersch, by himself at the Brookings  Panel in 1979,  and by Branson 
and Rotemberg at the International  Seminar in Macroeconomics in 
1979.1 Those papers were stimulated by the increase in European 
unemployment  relative to that of the United States that had already 
occurred in the aftermath  of the 1973-74 oil shock, and, like Sachs's 
present paper, they distinguished  between overly restrictive  policy in 
Europe  and a structural  increase  in the natural  rate  of unemployment  as 
1. See Jeffrey  D. Sachs, "Wages, Profits,  and Macroeconomic  Adjustment:  A Com- 
parative  Study,"  BPEA,  2:1979,  pp. 269-320;  William  H. Branson  and  Julio  J. Rotemberg, 
"International  Adjustment  with Wage Rigidity,"  European  Economic  Review, vol. 13 
(May 1980),  pp. 309-32; and Herbert  Giersch, "Aspects of Growth,  Structural  Change, 
and Employment-A  Schumpeterian  Perspective," Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, vol. 
115,  no. 4 (1979),  pp. 629-52. 
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alternative  interpretations.  The leading  candidate  to explain  a structural 
increase  was rigidity  in the adjustment  of real wage rates to the decline 
in productivity  growth  that  afflicted  most  industrial  countries  after 1973. 
In this paper  the author's  analysis focuses on a new variable  called 
the wage gap, which is simply the actual real product  wage divided by 
the trend  in labor  productivity.  Two other ways of describing  the wage 
gap are as trend unit-labor  cost deflated by the value-added  deflator, 
and, perhaps  most usefully, as an index of the share  of labor  compensa- 
tion in manufacturing  value added, adjusted  for cyclical movements  in 
labor  productivity.  The paper  consists of a demonstration  that  the wage 
gap matters greatly in comparative macroeconomics and offers an 
explanation  of time-series  and cross-country  movements  in unemploy- 
ment, inflation,  and  profits. 
The paper's basic argument  can be summarized  in three points: (1) 
the large  wage gaps, together  with the direct effects of extremely tight 
monetary  policies, account for the high OECD unemployment  rates, 
which  implies  that  a significant  reduction  in  unemployment  requires  both 
a loosening of monetary  policy and a reduction  in the wage gap; (2) a 
large wage gap shifts the Phillips  curve upward,  which suggests that in 
countries  with  a large  current  wage  gap,  expansionary  policy  will  produce 
more  inflation  than  in previous  periods  with a lower wage gap;  and (3) a 
demand  expansion is unlikely to meliorate  the wage squeeze, that is, 
lower the wage gap. The paper is  ambitious, comprehensive, and 
stimulating,  all the more so because its policy message is profoundly 
gloomy. 
Part  of my discussion  is already  anticipated  in the paper  by Sachs. In 
an imaginative  and effective aside, Sachs pretends  that he is writing  in 
1934 and shows that the available data at that time could have been 
misinterpreted  as suggesting that the Great Depression was due to 
excessive real wage growth rather  than insufficient  aggregate  demand. 
He then suggests  what "Gordon,  who might  have been the discussant  of 
this work,  would  have asked.  .  .  ."  In the lines written out for me,  I 
would have focused on  the difference between cyclical and trend 
productivity and on the lack of  cross-country correlation between 
changes in labor's share and changes in unemployment  rates. Indeed, 
some of my attention  below is directed  to those issues. 
Before I take up those points, however, it is useful to review the 
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the wage gap, unemployment,  and the business cycle. It is particularly 
appropriate  that William  Branson  was involved in developing the hy- 
pothesis  that  real  wage rigidity  is at the heart  of Europe's  unemployment 
problem  because  his graduate  textbook,  written  more  than  a decade  ago, 
contains  a complete analysis of the consequences of nominal  and real 
wage rigidity in a classroom aggregate  demand-supply  model. Since 
Sachs's wage gap is the real product wage adjusted for the trend in 
productivity,  the textbook analysis already  contains numerous  predic- 
tions for the behavior of the wage gap in an economy having a zero 
productivity  trend.  A review of those predictions  follows. 
First, the most obvious connection is cyclical. If the price level 
displays  a greater  amplitude  of procyclical  fluctuations  than  the nominal 
wage rate, then the real wage, and hence the wage gap, varies counter- 
cyclically. A negative correlation  between the wage gap and output is 
thus predicted. If the labor supply curve is vertical  and the quantity  of 
labor employed is continuously  determined  along a downward  sloping 
labor  demand  curve, then the wage gap is positively correlated  with the 
unemployment  rate. Note that this positive correlation  occurs without 
any mention  of supply  shocks or wage push, nor  any implication  that  the 
aggregate  output  supply  curve is vertical. 
Second, if there is an autonomous  upward  push on the nominal  wage 
rate,  the aggregate  supply  curve  is shifted  upward  but  remains  positively 
sloped. Any temporary  loss in output can be "inflated  away" by the 
central bank. The resulting  short-run  positive correlation  between the 
unemployment  rate and wage gap does not imply that expansionary 
policy is impotent. 
Third, if there is an autonomous upward  push on real wages, the 
aggregate  supply curve is rotated  into a vertical  position if workers  are 
able to maintain  the new higher  real wage with implicit  or explicit 100 
percent cost-of-living-allowance  (COLA) clauses. Now expansionary 
policy fails to raise output, and an increase  in the rate of nominal  GNP 
growth  raises the inflation  rate  in proportion. 
Fourth,  if an oil shock or other  adverse  event reduces  the level of the 
marginal  product  of labor  while  the real  wage  remains  rigid,  the  aggregate 
supply  curve also becomes vertical. If the real wage declines but not in 
full proportion  to the drop in labor's marginal  product, the aggregate 
supply  curve becomes steeper  but not vertical. 
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first  major  conclusion-that  the wage gap helps to explain the secular 
rise  in  unemployment  since 1973-Sachs points  to the  positive  coefficient 
on the wage gap in equations  explaining  unemployment  in his table 5. 
Yet the textbook analysis shows that such a positive correlation  has no 
implications  at all for the slope of the aggregate  supply  curve, and  hence 
for the division  between inflation  and  output  growth  of an expansionary 
policy that  accelerates  nominal  GNP growth. 
Further,  the positive coefficients  on the wage gap in his table 5 must 
mainly  reflect  cyclical  influences,  because  the wage  gap  has  no predictive 
power in explaining cross-country differences in the secular rise in 
unemployment  since 1973. This seems obvious in my table 1 below, 
which  contains  data  on the unemployment  rate  and  wage gap  for Sachs's 
six countries plus Italy, the missing member  of Europe's "big four." 
Leaving  aside for the moment  the cyclical movement  from 1979  to 1981, 
for Sachs' first  conclusion  to be validated,  those countries  experiencing 
the largest  increases in unemployment  between the cyclical peak years 
of 1973  and 1979  should also exhibit the largest increase in their wage 
gaps. Yet the largest absolute increases in unemployment  occurred  in 
France, the United Kingdom,  and Germany,  in that order,  whereas the 
largest  increases  in  the  wage  gap  occurred  in  Japan,  the United  Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
To determine  whether  this visual impression  is correct, I performed 
some simple  correlation  tests. For  a measure  of the change  in unemploy- 
ment, I used both the percentage  change  and absolute change  in unem- 
ployment  between both 1973  and 1979  and  between 1973  and 1981.  This 
was correlated  with the absolute change in the wage gap between 1973 
and 1979  and  between 1973  and 1981,  using  two estimates  of productivity 
for 1981:  first,  an extrapolation  of 1973-79  trend  productivity,  and  second, 
actual productivity  in that year. The results were uniformly  negative, 
with no correlation  yielding  a significance  level better than 38 percent, 
in contrast  to the usual  standard  of 5 percent.2  The same  negative  results 
occurred  with new measures of the wage gap, shown in the last three 
rows of my table 1 and based on the fitted values of productivity 
regressions,  as explained  below. 
2. The actual  test conducted  was a regression  of a measure  of unemployment  change 
on a constant  and  the change  in the wage  gap.  The highest  t-ratio  on the wage  gap  was 1.0. 
There  were  two regressions  for 1979  corresponding  to the two measures  of unemployment 
change,  andfourregressions  for 1981,  corresponding  to the  two  measures  of unemployment 
change  and  two measures  of the 1981  wage  gap. )0  00 
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Another  fact, not sufficiently  emphasized  in Sachs's paper,  emerges 
from  the data  underlying  the wage gap calculations.  The growth  rate of 
labor productivity  in manufacturing  slowed in 1973-79 compared to 
1960-73  in every one of the seven countries. But real wage rates were 
not rigid  in most countries. As shown by the change in the wage gaps 
between 1973  and 1979  in table 1 above, the growth rate of real wage 
rates slowed by as much or more than productivity  growth  in Canada, 
France, Germany,  and Italy. Only in Japan,  the United States, and the 
United Kingdom did real wage growth slow appreciably less  than 
productivity. Because the behavior of unemployment  in the United 
States appears to  pose  no mysteries that cannot be  explained by 
demographic  changes and aggregate  demand  fluctuations,  and because 
Japan  has not experienced  a significant  increase in unemployment,  the 
hypothesis of real wage rigidity as a cause of higher unemployment 
through  1979  appears  to be limited  to the United Kingdom. 
My second reservation  concerns Sachs's second conclusion,  that  the 
wage gap shifts the Phillips curve upward. This conclusion seems 
compatible  with  the emphasis  in work  by Perry  and  by me on wage push 
and supply shocks as a source of upward  shifts in the Phillips  curve in 
several OECD countries.3  However, Sachs's inflation  equations  in his 
table  6 are statistically  flawed  because they are guaranteed  to introduce 
an upward  bias in the coefficient on the wage gap. The easiest way to 
demonstrate  this point is to observe that the wage gap, W, , can be 
rewritten  as last period's wage gap, W9_1,  plus the current  percentage 
change  in the wage rate, w, minus  the current  change  in the value-added 
deflator, p,,, minus trend productivity change,  y: 
(1)  Wg =  W9,  I +  w,-p1t-  y 
Sachs specifies  w, in his equation 10b  for Europe  as a linear  function  of 
the unemployment  rate  and  the change  in consumer  prices,  p,,  the latter 
having  a coefficient  of 1.0, and  he finds  that  the coefficient  is 1.0  or above 
for all countries  analyzed except the United States and Canada.  Thus 
we can substitute  Sachs's 10b  into equation  1 here and  obtain 
(2)  Wtg  =  Wtg  + a0 -  aIU,  + P-  Pt-  y 
3. See George  L. Perry,  "Determinants  of Wage  Inflation  around  the World,"  BPEA, 
2:1975,  pp.  403-35;  and  Robert  J.  Gordon,  "World  Inflation  and  Monetary  Accommodation 
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In his table 6 Sachs regresses the current  change  in the consumer  price 
index, PC,, on its own lagged values, an average of current  and lagged 
import  price changes, an average  of the current  and lagged unemploy- 
ment  rate, and  an average  of the current  and  lagged  wage gap. Since the 
current  wage gap as defined in my equation  2 depends on the current 
value of pc, with a coefficient  of 1.0, table 6 effectively regresses  pc, on 
its own current value. Thus  the wage gap  variable  (which  contains  pc,)  is 
positively  correlated  with  the error  term  in the  pc,  equations  of that  table, 
and  thus all the wage-gap  coefficients  in the table  are biased upward. 
The section of Sachs's paper  that  is most novel and interesting  to me 
is the analysis supporting  the final  conclusion, that Europe  differs  from 
the United States not only in the character of its wage-adjustment 
process, but also in the nature of productivity  fluctuations  during  the 
business cycle. In the United States one is accustomed  to the idea that 
labor  is hoarded  in cyclical downturns,  so that  an expansion  of aggregate 
demand  brings with it growth in productivity  that is above trend. In 
Europe, however, Sachs asserts that the overall effect of a sustained 
rise in unemployment  is to raise measured  productivity  relative  to trend. 
Sachs implies  that  a demand  expansion  that  reduces  unemployment  will 
thus cause productivity  growth  to decline. By the data  of table 1 above, 
this suggests that not just the 1981 trend measure of the wage gap 
understates the true gap, but even  the  1981 actual may imply an 
understatement.  If productivity  growth were to decline further  below 
the 1973-79 trend than what already occurred in 1979-81, and if real 
wage growth occurs at anything like the recent rates in Europe, the 
implied  wage gaps for a future  year like 1985  would  be enormous. 
Sachs provides table 12 to  support the proposition that cyclical 
productivity  behavior  differs  in Europe  compared  to the United States. 
His table shows that, except for Japan, a sustained  increase in unem- 
ployment raises the level of manufacturing  productivity,  in the sense 
that the sum of coefficients on current and lagged unemployment  is 
positive in every country but Japan. There are two problems  with the 
specification  that Sachs uses in table 12. First, the dependent  variable 
refers to the manufacturing  sector while the right-hand  variables for 
unemployment  refer to the entire economy (this is also a problem  in 
tables 5 and 6). Second, there is a secular trend in the unemployment 
rate series for several countries that may be accounted for by factors 
other  than  the wage gap, for example,  a demographic  shift  in the United Jeffrey  D. Sachs  297 
States. Thus I prefer  to estimate  the cyclical response of labor  produc- 
tivity using the specification  developed in my 1979  BPEA paper, with 
the ratio of hours to trend  output,  HIQ*,  related  to the ratio  of actual  to 
trend  output, Q/Q*:4 
(3)  H  KQ)Ae-gt 
If the parameter  ,3  is 1.0, a permanent  increase  in Q/Q*  has no effect on 
actual  labor  productivity,  whereas  a lower  value  of ,3  means  a permanent 
productivity  gain, and vice versa. In all other respects my attempt  to 
estimate equation 3 duplicates the choices made in Sachs's table 12 
(regarding  sample  period,  definition  of trend  variables,  and  the choice of 
a current  and two lagged  values for the output  ratio, Q/Q*). 
The results  of this  investigation  yield  different  conclusions  from  those 
in Sachs's table 12. The first column in the display below shows the 
estimated sum of the coefficients  on the current  and two lagged values 
of the output ratio, Q/Q*. To develop the second column, I ran a 
simulation  of the estimated version of my equation 3 for 1982-85  and 
compared  two time paths  for Q/Q*.  In the first  the output  ratio  remains 
at its 1981  value. In the second the output  ratio  is raised  by expansionary 
policy by 2.5 percent  in 1982  and  then  by 5.0 percent  in 1983-85  over the 
1981  value for each country. A positive number  in the second column 
shows the percentage  increase  in the level of productivity  in 1985  created 
by the demand  expansion;  a negative  number,  the percentage  decline in 
1985  productivity. 
Effect of expansion 
Sum of  on 1985 
coefficients  productivity 
Canada  1.20  - 1.1 
France  0.83  0.9 
Germany  1.55  -2.8 
Italy  0.80  1.0 
Japan  0.49  2.5 
United  Kingdom  0.97  0.2 
United  States  1.00  0.0 
4.  See Robert  J. Gordon,  "The 'End-of-Expansion'  Phenomenon  in Short-Run  Pro- 
ductivity  Behavior,"  BPEA,  2;1979,  pp. 447-61. Equation  3 here  is also equation  3 in that 
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My conclusion  is thus that  the countercyclical  productivity  phenom- 
enon emphasized  by Sachs on the basis of the results in his table 12 is 
validated here only for Canada and Germany. There is no marked 
dichotomy  between the United States and Europe. In fact, behavior  in 
France,  Italy, and  the United Kingdom  seems quite  similar  to that  in the 
United States.5 The last three rows of my table 1 above show new 
values  for  the  wage  gap  obtained  from  the fitted  values  of my  productivity 
regressions  when Q/Q*  is set equal to 1.0 in each year. These adjusted 
wage-gap measures differ little from the unadjusted  trend measures 
except in the case of Germany. 
A final overall comment on the Sachs paper is that it exaggerates 
differences  in behavior  between Europe  and the United States. While  a 
detailed  evaluation  of the wage  and  price  regressions  is beyond  the scope 
of these comments, other work done by myself and my student  George 
Kahn  indicates  that  differences  in wage  and  price  behavior  among  Sachs's 
six countries  are a matter  of degree, not a matter  of kind.6  A dilemma 
posed by this type of comparative macroeconomic research is that 
unusual  behavior seems to occur in individual  countries  rather  than a 
pattern  common  to a whole set of countries.  For instance, in my table 1, 
Japan  is peculiar  because of the huge increase in its wage gap without 
any marked  increase in unemployment,  while France at the opposite 
extreme has suffered the greatest increase in unemployment  with no 
important  changes in its wage gap. Similarly,  Germany  seems to be an 
outlier in the countercyclical  nature  of its productivity  response. The 
anomalies  would multiply  if other  countries  experiencing  relatively  low 
increases in unemployment  (Austria and Sweden, for instance) were 
added  to the sample.  These doubts  about  the general  applicability  of the 
relations developed in the Sachs paper suggest that many fascinating 
empirical  puzzles await resolution by those who are concerned with 
these central  problems  in comparative  macroeconomics. 
5. These results  for the United  States differ  from  my 1979  paper  in yielding  a sum of 
coefficients  of 1.0 rather  than  0.8. Since the two sets of results  differ  in the sector of the 
economy  covered, they indicate  that  a permanent  increase  in Q/Q*  in the manufacturing 
sector does not provide  the same permanent  productivity  bonus  as occurs in the private 
business  sector. 
6.  See Robert J. Gordon, "The Wage and Price Adjustment  Process in Six Large 
OECD Countries," paper presented at the Wingspread  Conference  on the Evolving 
International  Financial  System, Wingspread,  Wisconsin,  July 1982;  and  George  A. Kahn, 
"Nominal  and  Real  Wage  Stickiness  in Six OECD  Countries:  A Comparative  Macroecon- 
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Jeffrey D. Sachs: Gordon  rejects major  elements of my arguments  on 
the basis of three assertions:  (1) that the "wage gap" does not explain 
cross-country  differences  in unemployment  behavior;  (2) that the wage 
gap may not explain Phillips curves shifts as I claim, because the 
statistical  evidence that I present  is biased; and (3) that an argument  in 
my paper  concerning  cyclical productivity  behavior  is wrong. He also 
stresses that  a large  wage gap does not imply  a vertical  supply  schedule, 
a point on which I concur and to which I devote several pages of text. 
Gordon's  observations  are helpful  in indicating  several areas in which 
my discussion  needs  elaboration,  but  on close scrutiny  none  of his points 
presents  a major  problem  for the theses of the paper. 
Gordon  does not dispute  the sharp  rise since 1969  in the normalized 
share  of labor  throughout  the major  OECD economies except Canada. 
Even  using  his  preferred  productivity  equations,  to which  I return  below, 
there are important  positive wage gaps for all countries  except Canada 
in 1981  (and  the modest  wage  gap  for France  grows  significantly  between 
1981 and 1982 according to my table 4). The dispute is about the 
importance  of that  finding,  not whether  there has been a shift in labor's 
share. 
My table 5 presents  evidence that changes  in the wage gap in several 
countries  help to track  unemployment  in the past two decades. Gordon 
does not question this evidence, but points out that "such a positive 
correlation  has no implications  at all  for  the slope of the aggregate  supply 
curve," which is of course true, but not germane  to the issue of table 5. 
The point there is to suggest that real wage moderation  is necessary; 
Gordon's  point  is that  demand  expansion  may  bring  it about.  This is also 
the point  of my example  of the Great  Depression.  I 
Gordon's  challenge  to the argument  that  real  wages are  too high  rests 
on cross-country  evidence. He compares  for seven countries  the change 
in unemployment  between 1973  and 1979  (and 1981)  with a change  in his 
wage-gap  measure for the same period, and finds little cross-country 
1. Gordon  misconstrues  this example  by saying  that  I include  it to show  that  available 
data  at that  time  could  have been misinterpreted  to suggest  that  the Great  Depression  was 
due to excessive real wage growth  rather  than  to insufficient  aggregate  demand.  Gordon 
sets up  a false dichotomy  here. Both  the wage  and  demand  factors  were  present.  Demand 
deflation  raised  real  wages,  and  moderation  of real  wages  was necessary  for  recovery.  The 
moderation  was brought  about  by demand  expansion. 300  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
correlation.  For example, in his table  Japan  shows a large  wage gap but 
a small  rise in unemployment,  while France  has a small  wage gap and a 
large  rise. There  are three  explanations  for this observation.  First, even 
though  unemployment  is a function  of Wg  in most economies, it is not 
the same  function  everywhere,  as Gordon  implicitly  assumes in his test. 
Second, there are important  lags in the relation  between Wg  and U, and 
hence U,_  I is present in my regressions  (see my table 5). Third, Wg  is 
only one of several variables  that  may cause unemployment  to change.2 
The first point is probably most important. The text shows that 
log (LfIL)  is a positive  function  of Wg.  However, log (LfIL)  does not equal 
the unemployment  rate if the labor  force changes  over the cycle. Let Ls 
be the labor  force, with  If the  labor  input  at  full  employment,  and  suppose 
that  discouraged-worker  effects make  Ls =  Lf(LILf)b,  0 < b <  1.3 Define 
U as log (LsIL)  and suppose that log (LIIf)  =  -  a  Wg, where a is the same 
across  countries.  Then U  =  a(l  -  b)W9. A country with an important 
discouraged-worker  effect will show a small  coefficient  on Wg  in the U 
equation.  Japan  is a case in point. It is well known  that  Japanese  women 
who lose their  jobs frequently  move directly  out of the labor  force from 
employment, without ever being counted as unemployed;  thus Japan 
shows very procyclical  participation  rates. Even if a rise in Wg  has the 
same  effect on man-hours  in Japan  as elsewhere, its effect on unemploy- 
ment  will seem far smaller.4  Similar  effects can be seen in countries  like 
Switzerland,  in which  job losers are often foreign  "guest workers"  who 
return  to their country  of origin  upon  job loss. There are several other 
reasons why the coefficient  linking  Wg  to U may differ  across countries, 
including  differences  in technology, adjustment  of labor input  through 
2. With  regard  to the second  and  third  points,  consider  the case of Germany.  In 1973, 
Germany  already  had a large Wg,  but still a low U, in part because of a strong  money 
expansion,  as described  in the text. Between 1973  and 1979  U rose strongly,  but Wg  hardly 
changed-it remained  high  throughout  the interval.  Gordon's  simple  test would  reject  a 
link between U and Wg.  The regressions  in table 5 indicate a strong link, but not an 
instantaneous  or exclusive link. 
3. With  an added-worker  effect predominant,  b < 0 would result. The same general 
theme, that  the coefficient  on Wg  in the U equation  is sensitive  to b, would  of course still 
apply. 
4.  For a recent discussion of Japanese  unemployment  measures  that examines the 
issue of cyclical participation  rates of women, see K. Hamada  and Y. Kurosaka,  "The 
Relationship  between  Production  and Unemployment  in Japan:  Okun's  Law in Compar- 
ative Perspective," paper  presented  at the International  Seminar  on Macroeconomics, 
Maison  des Sciences de L'Homme,  Paris,  June 1983. Jeffrey D.  Sachs  301 
Table 1. The Slowdown  in Growth of Man-hours  and Increases in 
Wage Gaps, 1960481a 
Growth  of man-hours  in manufacturing  Changein 
(annual  rates)  the wage 
Slowdown  gap 
1960-70  1970-81  (percentage  (percentage 
Country  (percent)  (percent)  points)  points) 
Canada  1.7  0.9  0.8  -  0.6b 
France  0.8  -1.4  2.2  1.6 
Germany  0.2  -2.8  3.0  9.9 
Japan  2.7  -0.3  3.0  16.  Ic 
United Kingdom  -0.8  -4.0  3.2  9.6 
United States  1.4  0.4  1.0  2.4 
Source:  Author's calculations,  based on data from U.S.  Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Office 
of Productivity  and Technology,  "Underlying  Data from Indexes  of Output per Hour: Hourly  Compensation,  and 
Unit Labor Costs  in Manufacturing, Eleven  Countries,  1950-81"  (BLS,  1982). 
a.  The  change in the wage gap is defined as the average  Wg for the  1971-81 period (denoted  WI71',),  minus the 
average  for  the  1960-70  period  (denoted  WL-70).  Note  that for Japan and Canada  the  latter period  is  shortened 
because  recent data are not available. 
b.  For Canada the change in Wg is  W817,79  -  W6o-70O 
c. For Japan  the change  in Wg  is W871i4  -  M60_70' 
work-week  adjustments  versus adjustments  through  layoffs or through 
early  retirement,  and so on. 
Since  the  behavior  of the labor  force  varies  so widely  across  countries, 
a better  cross-country  test should  rely on measures  of labor  input  rather 
than on comparisons of unemployment. My table 1 above shows a 
comparison  like the one Gordon  made, but I have replaced  unemploy- 
ment by growth  in man-hours  and used decade rates of change, rather 
than year-over-year  measures, to reduce the problem of lags. The 
evidence  for man-hours  strongly  supports  the wage-gap  view. Countries 
with small wage gaps-Canada,  France, and the United States-have 
had  much  smaller  declines in the growth  of man-hours  in manufacturing 
than  have the countries  with  large  wage  gaps-Germany, Japan,  and  the 
United Kingdom. 
Gordon's  second point challenges  the role of Wg  in the Phillips  curve 
equation  by pointing  out that  there may  be simultaneous-equations  bias 
on the Wg coefficient. This point is overstated. Consider Gordon's 
equation  2, which he uses to make  the point. Inflation  enters  only as the 
difference  between  Pc  and p,.  The  bias  exists  not  for  pure inflation 
shocks, but  only to the extent that  there  are  variables  left out of the price 
equation that affect pc  -  p,.  The main factor affecting this term has 302  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
probably  been the external supply shocks, which do appear in the 
equation  through  the variable  for import  prices. In any event, when my 
equation  7 is recalculated  using  lagged  Wg  (rather  than  0.5  Wg  + 0.  5  1), 
the wage gap is always positive and is significant  in three of six cases.5 
Also, in my table 11 lagged Wg  is used in the pv equation. Again, the 
coefficient  is always  positive and  is significant  half  the time. 
Gordon's  final  point  is a critique  of my productivity  equations.  These 
equations  indicate  that observed labor  productivity  may overstate  full- 
employment  labor productivity  in economies with a persistently high 
level of unemployment.  Before  turning  to the substance  of the argument 
I should  first  indicate  that Gordon  and I have little important  difference 
in results, with the exception of France. Gordon  finds, after  all, that (1) 
there is no large productivity  dividend  to be recaptured  by a return  to 
full employment  in Canada, Germany,  the United Kingdom, and the 
United States; (2) the large  dividends  occur only in Japan  (which  I also 
found) and France (where the results conflict);  and (3) the wage gaps 
calculated  on Gordon's  basis remain  large. 
Gordon correctly argues that my productivity  equation 15, which 
regresses V/L on U, can be improved  by regressing  L on V. I cannot 
comment in detail on Gordon's own calculations  on this basis, for his 
results arrived  without the supporting  equations or details. However, 
when I follow his lead, and  regress 
log(L,) =  ao +  aItime  +  a2T741  +  a310g(Vt) 
+  a4log  (V9,  1) +  a5 log (V,-2), 
I find that &3  +  &4  +  &5 is greater  than 1.0 for Canada,  Germany,  and 
the United Kingdom  (supporting  my earlier  conclusions),  near 1.0  in the 
United States (as before) and in France  (contrary  to my equation  in the 
text), and much less than 1.0 in Japan.6  Thus a productivity  dividend 
from  a return  to full employment  seems likely only in the United States 
5. The coefficients  (with  t-statistics  in parentheses)  on Wg  are  as follows:  Canada,  24.5 
(1.22);  France, 14.5  (1.16);  Germany,  32.8  (2.62);  Japan,  33.3  (1.36);  the United  Kingdom, 
82.7 (4.00); and the United States, 26.3 (1.90). The coefficient  for the United States is 
significant  at p = 0.10, and the coefficients  for Germany  and  the United  Kingdom  at p = 
0.05. 
6. Thus  my qualitative  results  agree  with  those of Gordon  for all countries  considered 
except the United Kingdom.  I do not know the source of this discrepancy.  I find the 
following  values of  &3  +  &4  +  &5: Canada, 1.22; France, 0.93; Germany,  1.53; Japan, 
0.56;  the United  Kingdom,  1.35;  and  the United  States, 0.93. Jeffrey D.  Sachs  303 
and  France,  where  the effect will  be small,  and  in  Japan,  where  the effect 
is significant. And as Gordon's results also show, these gains are in 
any event too  small to eliminate the wage gap that we have both 
calculated. 
General Discussion 
James  Duesenberry  pointed  out that  one important  implication  of the 
Sachs's paper  was the existence of a very strong  feedback  effect of price 
changes on wages. Workers  appear  to be intransigent  in their  demands 
for real wage growth, so the effect of price inflation  is to raise nominal 
wages immediately.  Duesenberry  urged Sachs to explain this result in 
terms  of some simple  model  of price setting  and  wage determination. 
Laurence  Weiss stressed  that  such a model  would  have to distinguish 
between centralized  European  and decentralized  U.S. wage bargaining 
institutions.  Given  the institutional  framework,  he wondered  what  goals 
should  be attributed  to European  workers  and  firms  and  what  theoretical 
model  could  explain  the apparent  responsiveness  of output  to expansion- 
ary demand  policy in the absence of movements  on real wages. Sachs 
responded that unions until recently had been attempting  to secure 
constantly growing real wages. This is naturally  increasingly  hard to 
accomplish  when unemployment  rises sharply,  as unions have come to 
recognize. The price-setting  behavior  of firms  appears  to be determined 
within a very long-term  framework,  with customer relations of para- 
mount importance. In the short run, demand expansion can increase 
production  and alter  marginal  costs without  affecting  real  wages. 
Martin  Neil Baily argued that it was implausible  to believe in the 
existence of structurally  different  wage  determination  and  business  cycle 
models for the United States and Europe. The fact that the equations 
Sachs estimated showed fundamentally  different coefficients for the 
different  economies raised  doubts  about  the reliability  of the equations. 
Sachs responded that, as Weiss had noted, the degree of unionization 
and the synchronization  of bargaining  in Europe were quite different 
from those in the United States. This leads to a difference  in timing  of 
many  business-cycle phenomena,  but not necessarily  to a difference  in 
underlying  forces governing the economies. There is, for example, a 
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fundamental  difference  in long-run  behavior.  Nonetheless, these timing 
differences  are important  for short-term  policymaking,  and they have 
caused different  economies to respond  differently  to similar  shocks. In 
several  European  economies, and in particular  in the United Kingdom, 
real wages are considerably  above their full-employment  level. Baily 
also was skeptical  that the productivity  response to cyclical unemploy- 
ment  could  differ  across  countries  as much  as estimates  by Sachs  implied. 
Duesenberry  argued  that  the paper  should  have  dealt  more  thoroughly 
with  the role of international  trade  in wage determination.  Several  of the 
countries considered have very open economies so that the terms of 
trade could be expected to have important  effects on real wage rates. 
C. Fred Bergsten pointed out a clear correlation  between  jumps in the 
wage gap and fluctuations  in a country's  exchange  rate. For example, a 
major  jump in the gap occurred in 1978  for Germany  and Japan, two 
countries whose currencies were overvalued in that year. Similarly, 
from 1978 to 1982 big jumps occurred in the wage gap in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and to some extent France, countries 
whose currencies  became overvalued  in that  period. 
William  Fellner  commented  on the relation  between Keynes's policy 
prescriptions and those of Minister of Economics Otto Lambsdorff 
for Germany.  At the time Keynes wrote the General Theory he saw no 
contradiction  between his conclusion that the real wage was too high 
and his call for expansionary  policies. During  the previous years there 
had been steep deflation  of prices, and expansionist  policies were not 
likely to cause inflationary  instability.  Today, Lambsdorff's  views are 
shaped by the fact that prices have been rising in recent years so that 
expansionist  policies could cause sharp  inflationary  pressures. 